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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Loulis, still an infant, was found imprisoned in an institution that kept 
him in a small concrete cell, with no sense of the weather or the time of day 
outside.1  The temperature in the cells would drop below fifty degrees 
Fahrenheit.2  Loulis’s mother had been intentionally infected with the HIV 
virus, leaving her huddled in the corner, fading away, with metal bolts 
jutting from her head.3  It was likely that she could no longer recognize 
Loulis as her son.4  Loulis, intelligent enough to feel the pain of loneliness 
and the unnatural environment, stared through the bars of his cell.5  
Unfortunately for Loulis, he is a chimpanzee, so he had no legal remedy to 
address his suffering.6 
This Comment explores the ramifications of giving animals like Loulis 
rights, or a cause of action, so that they can assert their interests.  Due to 
their advanced cognitive functioning, at least some animals equitably 
deserve strong protection from unnecessary suffering.  Current state and 
federal law is inadequate in providing that protection.  Animal law scholars 
have suggested that animals should be granted affirmative rights to be able 
to assert their fundamental interests.  Unfortunately, this solution is unlikely 
to be currently feasible because the American economy relies too heavily on 
the use of animals, and there would be no way to harness the immense 
ramifications of animal rights.  However, an effective compromise can be 
reached through the use of a tort cause of action, allowing animals to sue for 
wrongful abuse. 
 1.  STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 2 (2001) 
[hereinafter WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE]. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id.  The institution that held Loulis and his mother, along with other chimpanzees used for 
research, was the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia.  Id.  Luckily, Loulis 
was discovered by Roger Fouts, a primatologist.  Id.  Fouts took Loulis to an adoptive mother, 
Washoe, another chimpanzee who knew sign language and had recently lost a child.  Id.  “Loulis did 
not want to sleep in Washoe’s arms that first night and curled up instead on a metal bench.  At four 
o’clock in the morning, Washoe suddenly awakened and loudly signed ‘Come, baby.’  The sound 
jerked Loulis awake, and he jumped into Washoe’s arms.”  Id. 
  But, after years of learning sign language and living with his adoptive family, Loulis faced 
another challenge that came from lacking legal rights: 
As years passed, Fouts realized that Yerkes could call in its loan and put Loulis to the 
knife, as his mother had been.  When Loulis was seventeen years old, Fouts sought to buy 
him outright.  Yerkes agreed to sell for $10,000, which Fouts didn’t have.  After 
strenuous efforts, he raised that amount.  But at the last second, a hitch developed.  Ten 
thousand dollars was Loulis’s purchase price.  As if Yerkes were selling Fouts a desk or 
chair, Fouts was charged another 7.5 percent in Georgia sales tax. 
Id. at 3. 
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Part II of this Comment provides an overview of our current scientific 
knowledge about the intellectual and emotional capacities of animals.7  Part 
III gives an overview of current state and federal laws regarding the 
common uses of animals and introduces animal rights as an emerging type 
of law.8  Part IV describes the two main approaches to animal protection 
under the law—the welfare approach, which represents the status quo, and 
the rights approach, which represents a substantial divergence from legal 
precedent.9  Part V analyzes the ramifications of each of these approaches.10  
Part VI advocates a modified new tort cause of action as a balance between 
the welfare- and rights-based approaches.11  Part VII concludes.12 
II.  IF ANIMALS COULD TALK (OR IF HUMANS COULD LISTEN) 
A lot remains unknown about the minds of nonhuman animals.13  
Attempts to judge intelligence are clouded by the fact that each species 
“lives in a different world of its own sensory inputs and decoding 
mechanisms of those inputs.”14  Different species are intelligent in varied 
ways, so it would be unfair to compare them only with a human method of 
intelligence.15  However, as scientists begin learning to interpret the worlds 
of other species, scientific developments have shown that animals are a lot 
more intelligent, and their minds much more like ours, than was previously 
thought. 
These recent insights have fostered a wave of scholarly advocacy asking 
that society look at animals differently.16  Like other shifts in societal views, 
these ideas would become embodied as changes in the legal system.17  To 
illustrate the basis for these calls for change, this Section explores the mental 
capacities of the great apes, cetaceans, elephants, and other species such as 
farm animals and bees. 
 7.  See infra Part II. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
 11.  See infra Part VI. 
 12.  See infra Part VII. 
 13.  Although humans are also animals, this Comment uses the terms “nonhuman” and “animal” 
interchangeably for simplicity. 
 14.  STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 46 
(2003) [hereinafter WISE, DRAWING THE LINE]. 
 15.  See id. at 45–47. 
 16.  See infra Part IV. 
 17.  See infra Part IV. 
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A.  The Great Apes 
Members of the great ape family, which includes gorillas, orangutans, 
bonobos, and chimpanzees, are humans’ closest relatives.18  They share 
between 97% and 98.6% of our genetic code19 and are similar to us in many 
ways, possessing “skills, reasoning powers and emotions that were once 
thought to be uniquely human.”20  They teach, deceive, remember, self-
medicate, empathize, use insight to solve problems, use tools, and transmit 
culture.21  They also show a wide range of emotion, including grief at the 
death of loved ones.22 
Apes’ mental aptitude has been well-demonstrated by their learning and 
communicative achievements in controlled environments.  For instance, 
chimpanzees and orangutans have shown knowledge of conservation of 
quantities, a logical and mathematical skill equivalent to that gained by 
human children when they are six or seven years old.23  Additionally, 
chimpanzees have the ability to perform simplistic counting, addition with 
small integers, and even addition of fractions.24  Further, as an 
exemplification of apes’ language capacity, a bonobo has been able to learn 
 18.  Jane Goodall, Great Apes, ANIMAL PLANET, http://animal.discovery.com/fansites/jane 
goodall/interactives/greatape/greatape.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
 19.  Id.  Many scientists now think that humans and chimpanzees share 99.5% of working DNA.  
WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 182 (citing Morris Goodman et al., Primate 
Phylogency and Classification Elucidated at the Molecular Level, in EVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND 
PRACTICE: MODERN PERSPECTIVES 193, 207 (S. P. Wasser ed., 1999)). 
 20.  Paul Eccleston, Ape Genius Reveals Depth of Animal Intelligence, THE TELEGRAPH, May 2, 
2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/3341339/Ape-Genius-reveals-depth-of-animal-
intelligence.html (describing the scientific discoveries depicted in the film Ape Genius).  
“Chimpanzees share biological, physiological, behavioral, and social characteristics with 
humans . . . .”  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CHIMPANZEES IN BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH: ASSESSING THE NECESSITY 14 (Bruce M. Altevogt et al. eds., 2011). 
 21.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 4. 
 22.  “[C]himpanzees display grief and signs of depression that are reminiscent of human 
responses to similar situations.”  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 20, at 27. 
 23.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 186.  The conservation of liquid quantities 
refers to the concept that the amount of liquid in a container does not change when it is poured into a 
different-sized container.  Id.  In one test, researchers Josep Call and Philippe Rochat sought to 
compare this ability in orangutans and human children.  Id. at 187.  The orangutans and children 
were given a choice of two containers, one of which contained a larger volume.  Id.  The liquid from 
each container was then poured into two smaller containers of different shapes, making it less clear 
which one now held the larger volume.  Id.  All four orangutans consistently pointed to the smaller 
container with the larger volume—they may have done this by remembering and keeping track of 
the liquid from the original container that held the largest volume or watching the amount poured, or 
by a keen estimate of volume regardless of the container’s shape.  Id. at 187–88.  Most of the 
children, ranging in age from six years and six months to eight years and eight months, failed the 
test.  Id.  The researchers believed that this demonstrates superior creative problem-solving abilities 
in the orangutans.  Id. at 188. 
 24.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 188–90. 
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and understand up to 3000 English words.25  “[A]pes not only perceive and 
understand things in the immediate here and now but they also recall things 
they have perceived in the past and anticipate or imagine things that might 
happen in the future.”26 
There is evidence that the great apes have attained self-awareness and 
theory of mind, which are two major milestones in advanced cognitive 
functioning.27  Self-awareness refers to a level of consciousness such that 
animals are aware of themselves as distinct individuals and can understand 
that things are happening to them as distinguished from others.28  No human 
child under the age of fifteen months has shown self-awareness.29  Apes also 
possess theory of mind, which refers to the ability to attribute mental states 
and perceptions to others.30  In one seminal experiment, chimpanzees 
demonstrated their ability to know what others see when they were placed 
 25.  Eccleston, supra note 20. 
 26.  Michael Tomasello & Esther Herrmann, Ape and Human Cognition: What’s the Difference?, 
19 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 3, 3–4 (2010). 
 27.  Self-awareness and theory of mind are concepts that enable many advanced cognitive and 
social skills.  Self-awareness may underlie “the social complexity and altruistic tendencies shared 
among” humans, dolphins, elephants, and the great apes.  John Roach, Elephants Recognize Selves 
in Mirror, Study Says, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC NEWS, Oct. 30, 2006, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/10/061030-asian-elephants_2.html. 
 28.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 128, 198.  Self-awareness is typically 
determined using the mirror self-recognition (MSR) test, developed by psychologist Gordon Gallup, 
Jr. in the 1970s.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 36.  The MSR test involves placing 
marks on the animal being tested in a place where the marks could only be seen by looking in a 
mirror.  Id.  The animal is then brought in front of a mirror, and if he touches and examines the 
marks while peering in the mirror, the animal is self-aware—he realizes he is looking at an image of 
himself.  Id.  Although there is some disagreement over what successes and failures in the MSR test 
mean in particular, it is the most widely used and widely accepted test to determine self-awareness.  
Id.  The great apes have passed the MSR test.  Id. at 188–89, 223; WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, 
supra note 1, at 198–99.  In fact, some have gone far beyond this minimum requirement—such as 
Chantek, the orangutan who imitated a caregiver by using a mirror to curl his eyelashes with an 
eyelash curler.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 188–89. 
 29.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 199.  This is based on children’s ability to pass 
the MSR test.  Id.; see supra note 27. 
 30.  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 20, at 27; see also WISE, RATTLING THE 
CAGE, supra note 1, at 146–48, 194–95; Brian Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind: What 
Changed and Why?, 40 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 293, 294–300 (2011) [hereinafter Hare, From 
Hominoid to Hominid Mind].  See generally Janet Wilde Astington & Margaret J. Edward, The 
Development of Theory of Mind in Early Childhood, in ENCYCLOPEDIA ON EARLY CHILDHOOD 
DEVELOPMENT (2010), available at http://www.child-encyclopedia.com/documents/Astington-
EdwardANGxp.pdf (describing the development of theory of mind in children under five) (“We use 
theory of mind to explain our own behaviour to others, by telling them what we think and want, and 
we interpret other people’s talk and behaviour by considering their thoughts and wants.”). 
06 RICE SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:23 PM 
 
1108 
with a second chimpanzee and two pieces of food.31  One piece of food was 
visible to both chimpanzees, while the other piece was visible to the test 
subject but hidden from the second chimp.32  When the test subject was 
dominant over the other chimpanzee, he would first target the piece of food 
that was visible to both competitors, to try to monopolize both pieces.33  
However, when the test subject was the subordinate, he would target the 
hidden piece of food to obtain it.34  Thus, the chimpanzees were able to make 
strategic decisions based on what the second chimpanzee could see.35  Some 
scientists have read the great apes’ demonstration of these key attributes as 
proof that the cognitive gap between humans and apes is slight.36 
 31.  Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, at 297; see also Brian Hare, Josep 
Call, Bryan Agnetta & Michael Tomasello, Chimpanzees Know What Conspecifics Do and Do Not 
See, 59 ANIMAL BEHAV. 771 (2000) (creators of the experiment publishing their findings). 
 32.  Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, at 297. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id.  Further scientific observations support the conclusion that great apes possess theory of 
mind.  For instance, the ability to deceive shows an awareness of others’ mental states.  One 
observation involved a chimpanzee who was about to be fed bananas contained in a box.  WISE, 
RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 207.  When a second chimpanzee appeared, the first chimp 
quickly closed the box and “nonchalantly walked about ten feet away.”  Id.  The second chimp then 
feigned that he was walking away, but, once out of sight, spied on the first chimp from behind a tree.  
Id.  Once the first chimp returned to the box for the bananas, the second chimp sprang forward to 
take them.  Id. 
  Mandara, a gorilla, provides another example.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 
226.  She disliked one of the researchers at her zoo, barking threateningly when he was present.  Id.  
One day she devised a scheme, changing her behavior by reaching “through her bars in a friendly 
flat palm-up beckoning manner.”  Id. at 226–27.  The researcher was pleased, and came toward her.  
Id. at 227.  However, he had not noticed that her other hand was behind her back, concealing a piece 
of sharp bamboo.  Id.  When the researcher came close, she tried to stab him.  Id.  The researcher 
narrowly escaped injury after being alerted by another scientist.  Id. 
 36.  Theory of mind is thought to be a foundation that allows for humans’ unique culture and 
advanced social development.  Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, at 294; see 
also Astington & Edward, supra note 30, at 1 (describing theory of mind as the “most important 
development in early childhood social cognition”).  Scientists previously thought that self-awareness 
and theory of mind were uniquely human traits that allowed us to reach a much more advanced level 
of functioning than nonhuman animals.  See Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, 
at 296. 
  It was not until the turn of the twenty-first century that seminal experiments such as the one 
by Hare, Call, Agnetta, and Tomasello began to prove what researchers had conjectured—that apes 
and humans share theory of mind as well.  Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, at 
297; Hare, Call, Agnetta & Tomasello, supra note 31, at 771 (observations that chimpanzees 
followed the directions of gazes or engaged in deceit foretold the successful results of these 
experiments).  This evidence has changed the scientific community’s hypotheses of how humans 
have evolved since separating with our last common ancestor with the great apes.  Hare, From 
Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, at 295, 300; see, e.g., Tomasello & Herrmann, supra 
note 26, at 3 (humans separated from our last common ancestor with chimpanzees and bonobos 
about six million years ago, and with our last common ancestor with orangutans and gorillas about 
fifteen million years ago).  Formerly, scientists believed that humans gained the capacity for theory 
of mind after separating from that common ancestor, meaning that humans gained a significant 
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The lack of only a few mental skills prevents the great apes from having 
cultures that match ours in complexity.37  Like humans, apes can learn by 
imitation, pass on skills, and share rudimentary traditions.38  For example, 
chimpanzees in Senegal have learned and passed on the skill of using tools 
to hunt by sharpening spears with their teeth.39  Additionally, chimpanzees’ 
social sophistication is highlighted by observations that they politically 
strategize.40  In four wild chimpanzee societies, the chimps were observed 
forming “coalitions to subdue the despotic power of an alpha male.”41  Apes 
may also have a sense of morality—there is evidence that apes will act 
altruistically to help others, even without the expectation of benefit.42  
However, studies point to a social-cognitive ability in cooperative 
environments as the key difference between humans and apes.43  Humans 
collaborate with others in a more complex way than apes, which is 
cognitive ability that apes never obtained.  Hare, From Hominoid to Hominid Mind, supra note 30, at 
296–97.  Currently, scientists think that humans and apes gained theory of mind before that split, 
meaning that they share these principal cognitive abilities and that the difference between humans 
and apes is one only of degree.  Id. at 300. 
 37.  Eccleston, supra note 20. 
 38.  Eccleston, supra note 20.  “The generation of ideas and sharing a skill is a scientific 
definition of culture.”  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 5. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Felix Warneken, Brian Hare, Alicia P. Melis, Daniel Hanus & Michael Tomasello, 
Spontaneous Altruism by Chimpanzees and Young Children, 5 PLOS BIOLOGY 184 (2007) 
(publishing the results of their study).  In an experiment, chimpanzees spontaneously helped 
unfamiliar researchers obtain an object that was out of their reach, or helped by opening a door for a 
fellow chimpanzee, regardless of whether they would receive a reward.  Id. at 1414–18.  Therefore, 
altruism is not unique to humans.  Id. at 1418. 
 43.  Tomasello & Herrmann, supra note 26, at 5.  Herrmann, Call, Hernández-Lloreda, Hare, and 
Tomasello conducted a comprehensive study comparing chimpanzees and orangutans with two-year-
old human children in a variety of skills.  Id.  In their ability to understand the physical world—such 
as concepts of space, quantities, and causality—the children and apes performed very similarly.  Id.  
However, the human children were more advanced socially, particularly in cooperative situations.  
Id. 
  In another study, chimpanzees and human children were set to a task in which they were 
collaborating with an adult human: 
When the adult stopped participating, the chimpanzees simply tried to solve the task 
alone.  The human children, in contrast, employed various forms of communication to try 
to reengage the adult into the task.  The children seemed to understand that the two of 
them had committed themselves to doing this together and it simply would not do if the 
adult was shirking her duty.  The collaboration was structured by joint goals and joint 
commitments to one another.  It is not difficult to see in these simple activities the roots 
of the kind of collaborative commitments and activities that structure human social 
institutions, from governments to religions. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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manifested in skills such as advanced language using symbols.44  Although 
apes are able to transmit culture, they do not have the same fundamental 
motivation to constantly cooperate, communicate, teach, and build upon 
society’s accomplishments.45  Therefore, although the great apes are 
intelligent and emotional creatures, it may be this mere difference in social 
skillsets that has prevented humans and apes from evolving more similarly. 
The story of Loulis, the young chimpanzee who was rescued from 
Yerkes, provides a final example of ape intelligence.46  He was taken to live 
with an adoptive chimp mother, Washoe, who knew sign language.47  Within 
eight days with Washoe, Loulis had learned his first sign.48  Within five 
months, Loulis, now an accepted family member to the other chimpanzees, 
was using combinations of signs to communicate with the other 
chimpanzees and with humans.49  “At the end of five years, he was regularly 
using fifty-one signs; he had initiated thousands of chimpanzee 
conversations and had participated in thousands more.  He had learned 
everything he knew from the other chimpanzees, for no human ever signed 
to him.”50 
B.  Cetaceans and Elephants 
Cetaceans and elephants are often grouped along with great apes as 
animals that are highly intelligent and emotional.  Dolphins and elephants 
 44.  Id. at 5–6.  Further, while apes have the ability to communicate, nonhuman communication 
is focused on getting others to do what the communicator wants.  Id. at 5.  In contrast, humans 
communicate freely to exchange information.  Id.  Similarly, teaching is fundamental in human 
culture, and children are born equipped to listen and learn from adults, whereas intentional teaching 
is not as central in apes’ culture.  Id. at 6. 
 45.  Although apes and two-year-old human children have similar mental abilities in 
understanding physical concepts, it is largely the cooperative drive of humans that allows them to 
learn new skills rapidly and effectively build on the accomplishments of others.  Id. at 5–7. 
 46.  See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 47.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 3.  Washoe’s introduction to Loulis is also a 
testament to the deep emotion and comprehension of these animals.  Washoe was depressed and 
refused to eat after losing a child to illness, continuously signing that she wanted her baby.  ROGER 
FOUTS & STEPHEN TUKEL MILLS, NEXT OF KIN: MY CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIMPANZEES 233–40 
(1997), available at http://www.friendsofwashoe.org/learn/chci_history/loulis_joins_washoe.html.  
Her owner, primatologist Roger Fouts, worried that Washoe would die of heartbreak, something he 
had seen happen before with other chimpanzees.  Id.  He brought Loulis to cheer her up.  Id.  Before 
the introduction, Fouts signed to Washoe, “I HAVE BABY FOR YOU.”  Id.  Washoe snapped out 
of her depressed trance, shouting for joy, hair standing up, and excitedly exclaimed in sign language, 
“BABY, MY BABY, BABY, BABY!”  Id.  However, when she saw Loulis, her excitement ceased.  
Id.  She signed “BABY” with mild interest.  Id.  Fouts realized he forgot to specify that this was not 
her baby.  Id.  Luckily, Washoe’s maternal instincts rekindled, and she cared for Loulis as her own.  
Id. 
 48.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 3. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
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have been found to possess a cognitive level of self-awareness.51  It is 
possible that they possess theory of mind as well.52  Cetaceans and elephants 
are highly social creatures that live within complex societies, forming strong 
bonds with their groups.53  Cetaceans, like humans, form structured 
cooperative alliances.54  Cetaceans and elephants may also transmit culture 
across generations.55  Based on these intellectual attributes, it is reasonable 
to hypothesize that cetaceans and elephants possess the social-cognitive 
abilities of self-awareness and theory of mind.56 
Cetacean intelligence is well-demonstrated by their aptitude for 
language.  Dolphins have learned to understand a human-made language 
composed of signs or sounds of different tones.57  They have shown an 
ability to understand new sentences of up to five words, and pay attention to 
 51.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text; WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 
152–53, 169; Hart et al., Large Brains and Cognition: Where Do Elephants Fit In?, 32 NEUROSCI. 
AND BIOBEHAV. REVS. 86, 90 (2008); Betsy Querna, Dolphins Recognize, Admire Themselves in 
Mirrors, Study Finds, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC TODAY, May 2, 2001, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/05/0502_dolphinvanity.html; Roach, supra note 21. 
 52.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Hart et al., supra note 51, at 90–91 (arguing that 
elephants may possess theory of mind because they are empathetic in assisting injured elephants and 
because they inspect and ceremoniously handle the remains of deceased elephants); Adam A. Pack 
& Louis M. Herman, The Dolphin’s (Tursiops truncatus) Understanding of Human Gazing and 
Pointing: Knowing What and Where, 121 J. COMP. PSYCHOL. 34 (2007) (reporting, based on 
experimentation, that dolphins follow trainers’ gazing and pointing gestures, indicating that they 
understand others’ mental states with respect to where the trainers’ attention is focused).  But see 
Derek C. Penn & Daniel J. Povinelli, On the Lack of Evidence that Non-Human Animals Possess 
Anything Remotely Resembling a “Theory of Mind,” 362 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC. 731, 
731–35 (2007) (contending that since there may be other reasons for successful experimental results, 
the results are inconclusive in determining that animals possess theory of mind). 
 53.  Lori Marino, Convergence of Complex Cognitive Abilities in Cetaceans and Primates, 59 
BRAIN, BEHAV. & EVOLUTION 21, 27 (2002). 
A herd of elephants in Kenya provides an apt example of the strength of these bonds.  Marc Bekoff, 
Are You Feeling What I’m Feeling?, 194 NEW SCIENTIST 42 (2007).  Babyl, a member of the herd, 
had been crippled for years and could not keep up with the walking pace of the other elephants.  Id.  
However, instead of leaving her behind, her herd would continuously look back to see how she was 
doing, and would wait for her if she was struggling.  Id.  “The elephants had nothing to gain by 
helping her as she could do little for them. . . .  [Yet o]ut of friendship and empathy they adjusted 
their behaviour to allow Babyl to remain with the group.”  Id. 
 54.  Marino, supra note 53, at 27–28.  For example, bottlenose dolphins form coalitions for a 
type of “warfare” against other groups, and sperm whales take turns babysitting the group’s young 
while others forage for food.  Id. at 27–28. 
 55.  Id. at 28.  Cetaceans exhibit cultural traditions through dialects, tool use, and methods of 
capturing prey.  Id.  Elephants may similarly possess cultural traditions.  Id. 
 56.  See generally WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 152–54, 169–71 (discussing the 
possibility of elephant and dolphin self-awareness). 
 57.  Id. at 137–38. 
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the grammatical order of the words.58  The dolphins in one study also knew 
how to generalize symbols—a hoop was a hoop, whether square, round, 
large, or small.59 
Elephant intelligence is aptly demonstrated by their problem-solving 
abilities.  For example, elephants in the wild have been observed throwing 
heavy rocks or logs onto electric fences in order to disable them.60  Another 
group of elephants was observed digging holes in the ground looking for 
water.61  When a researcher came upon the holes, he “pulled out a long, wide 
piece of bark that an elephant had chewed into a ball, then used to plug the 
hole.”62  Underneath that section of ground was water, and not too far away 
was a tree from which the elephant stripped the bark.63  In captivity, another 
elephant learned to successfully distinguish four dots painted onto cardboard 
cards from three, no matter the configuration.64 
Cetaceans and elephants also experience deep, human-like emotions.  
The best illustration may be the accounts of cetaceans and elephants, along 
with great apes, mourning death.  “When an elephant dies, its family 
members engage in intense mourning and burial rituals, conducting 
weeklong vigils over the body, carefully covering it with earth and brush, 
[and] revisiting the bones for years afterward . . . .”65  They caress the bones, 
touching a skull’s lower jaw with their trunks “the way living elephants do 
in greeting.”66  In the case of cetaceans, research teams have witnessed 
mothers pushing their dead calves to the surface, appearing to be grieving 
and unable to accept the death.67  Providing support for these observations, 
scientists have discovered that whales have spindle neurons similar to those 
 58.  Id. at 140–44.  Sentences might consist of words such as “water right ball fetch,” which told 
the dolphin to go to the ball on her right and take it to the water streaming out of a hose.  Id. at 143–
44.  When the sentences were reversed or the order of the words was otherwise switched, the 
dolphins immediately understood that this changed the meaning.  Id.  So when the dolphin was told 
to “right water ball fetch,” she went to any ball and took it to the stream of water to her right.  Id. at 
144. 
 59.  Id. at 146. 
 60.  Id. at 171–72. 
 61.  Id. at 173. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 172. 
 65.  Charles Siebert, An Elephant Crackup?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/magazine/08elephant.html?pagewanted=print. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Rowan Hooper, Do Dolphins Have a Concept of Death?, 211 NEW SCIENTIST 10, 10 (2011).  
One dolphin was witnessed frantically pushing her dead calf to the surface for two days.  Id.  
Bruising on the calf indicated that the death was probably sudden.  Id.  Comparatively, when a 
dolphin became sick and had trouble swimming, its pod tried to help it stay afloat, but swam away 
after it died.  Id.  The research team’s hypothesis is that the pod did not grieve in the same way as the 
mother with her calf because they expected the death and were prepared for it.  Id.  Therefore, 
dolphins may understand the concept of death.  Id. 
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that exist in humans, which are associated with grief and the processing of 
emotions.68  “‘This is consistent with a growing body of evidence for 
parallels between cetaceans and primates in cognitive abilities, behaviour 
and social ecology.’”69 
C.  Other Species 
As the scientific community conducts studies on other animals that have 
generally not been associated with high intellectual capacities, the results are 
impressive.  For instance, farm animals such as cattle and sheep form deep 
emotional bonds.70  One study showed that sheep experienced stress  
(measured by increases in heart rate, stress hormones, and bleating) when 
separated from their flock.71  However, showing them pictures of familiar 
sheep faces reduced their stress.72  Pictures of goat faces and triangles did 
not have the same effect.73  According to Donald Broom, professor of animal 
welfare at the University of Cambridge, cows can also recognize familiar 
faces and form long-lasting bonds.74  They are also intellectual beings.  A 
 68.  Id.; Andy Coghlan, Whales Get Emotional, 192 NEW SCIENTIST 6 (2006).  These cells 
“occur in the parts of the human brain linked with social organisation, empathy, speech, intuition 
about the feelings of others and rapid ‘gut’ reactions.”  Coghlan, supra. 
 69.  Id. (quoting Lori Marino).  The cells were previously thought to exist only in humans and 
great apes, leading to unique emotional and cognitive abilities.  Id.  However, whales are now 
estimated to have three times more of the neurons than humans do.  Id. 
 70.  See, e.g., Global Action Network, Cows: About Cows, 
http://www.gan.ca/animals/cows.en.html (last updated 2005) (“Under natural circumstances, cattle 
live in herds with social hierarchies and form lifelong bonds with each other.”). 
 71.  Laura Spinney, More Than Meats the Eye, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 16, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2005/mar/17/1.  This study was conducted by Ana da Costa and 
her colleagues at the Babraham Institute in Cambridge.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.   Id.  Another study found that cows with names—who were treated on a more personal level 
by farmers—produced more milk than cows without names.  Caroline Gammell, Cows With Names 
Produce More Milk, Scientists Say, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 12, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/agriculture/farming/4358115/Cows-with-names-produce-more-
milk-scientists-say.html. 
  This scientific development provides foundational support for stories such as that of mother 
cows mourning and waiting outside for their calves, even in harsh conditions, after their calves have 
been taken to be slaughtered for veal, or stories of cows escaping and walking days to be reunited 
with their herd.  See, e.g., Fiona Carmody, Animal Intelligence: What They Know and You Don’t, 
THE COLLEGIAN, Sept. 9, 2010, available at http://thecollegianur.com/2010/09/09/animal-
intelligence-what-they-know-and-you-don%E2%80%99t/13120/; Global Action Network, supra 
note 70. 
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study has shown that cattle enjoy solving intellectual challenges.75  In the 
study, cows were given a task of pressing a panel in order to gain access to 
food.76  After a cow learned the task successfully, she experienced a leap in 
heart rate and was more likely to gallop—an expression of joy, or a “eureka” 
moment, at meeting the challenge.77  Other farm animals have also 
demonstrated the ability to learn.78  For example, another study showed that 
pigs, given the choice of two feeding stalls, will avoid the one that they had 
been shut into after eating on a previous date.79  Similarly, hens will self-
medicate by choosing food that has been laced with painkillers over food 
that has not.80  This suggests that farm animals, routinely tortured and 
slaughtered by humans for food, “are, at the very least, aware of what has 
happened in the past and of acting on it in future.”81 
Finally, nonhuman sophistication has surprised scientists through its 
embodiment in even seemingly insignificant creatures, proving that we may 
still have a lot to learn when it comes to the nonhuman world.  Take the 
surprising intelligence of mound-building mice, which construct elaborate 
mounds covering meter-deep burrows so that their young can survive the 
winter.82  Although the adult mice do not survive the winter season, they 
couple up and form stable bonds to work together to care for their young.83  
They live in their warm mounds as families, and can recognize who they are 
related to so as to avoid inbreeding.84 
Honeybees provide a final example of animal intelligence.  They have 
the capacity to remember, learn, and recognize “sameness” and “difference,” 
as was demonstrated by bees that learned to look at a choice of visual signs 
to successfully navigate a maze.85  Bees also have a good memory, which 
allows them to efficiently navigate complex routes when they are foraging 
 75.  Spinney, supra note 71.  The study was conducted by Donald Broom and Kristin Hagen.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Michael Marshall, Zoologger: Architect Mouse Builds a Food Mansion, NEW SCIENTIST, 
Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn20855-zoologger-architect-mouse-builds-a-
food-mansion.html. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 75.  For this study, bees were trained in a Y-
shaped maze.  Id.  When the bees entered the maze, they were shown a sign, which might be a 
vertical or horizontal line, or a sign colored blue or yellow.  Id.  Upon reaching a “decision chamber” 
at the intersection of the arms of the Y, the bee would encounter one arm showing the same sign as 
was at the maze entrance, and the other arm showing a different sign.  Id.  Choosing the identical 
sign led to a reward of a sip of sucrose.  Id.  The bees learned to select the correct sign.  Id. 
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for nectar.86  After just three encounters, a memory, such as an odor or 
landmark, will be in the honeybee’s long-term memory for the bee’s 
lifetime.87  Further, honeybees have a remarkably sophisticated 
communication system, which is thought to be second only to that of 
humans in complexity.88  They communicate in a dance-like form, using at 
least seventeen “signals” (deliberate acts of communication) and at least 
thirty “cues” (non-deliberate communicative behaviors), to communicate the 
particular distance, direction, and quality of food, to recruit others to 
transport discovered nectar, and to communicate the location of materials or 
of new cavities for hives.89  These findings caution us against 
underestimating nonhuman capacities. 
D.  New Standards in Scientific Use of Chimpanzees 
The scientific community has begun to adapt its practices based on its 
current knowledge of nonhuman minds.  The National Academy of Sciences 
acknowledged the sophistication of ape intelligence and emotion in a recent 
study to determine whether it is necessary to use chimpanzees as laboratory 
 86.  Id. at 76–77.  It is likely that bees have a “cognitive map” in their minds, complete with 
symbols, which allows them to navigate so well.  Id. at 77.  “Otherwise they would have to store an 
enormous number of images in their little bee brains to navigate as well as they do.”  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 76.  A honeybee’s lifetime is a matter of weeks or at the most a few months.  Id.  A 
memory will be part of a bee’s short-term memory after just one exposure.  Id. 
 88.  Id. at 77. 
 89.  Id. at 78–80.  The bees look to this communication to coordinate their work.  For example, 
in one type of signal, a bee can communicate that he has found a good nectar source, but that the 
hive already has more nectar coming in than it can handle.  Id. at 79.  Other bees will respond by 
switching to the task of processing nectar, or, if outside the hive, will cease recruiting bees to their 
nectar source since a better one was found.  Id. at 79–80.  Bees also communicate about new 
locations for building hives when their current hive becomes overcrowded.  Id. at 80.  Those 
searching for new sites will return and communicate the location and desirability of those sites.  Id.  
What happens next is somewhat like a vote.  The bees advocating for one location may visit another 
site and change positions if they realize the other site is better, indicating toward the new location in 
their communicative dance.  Id. at 80–81.  This shows that bees can likely think and change their 
minds as a result of exchanging information through communication.  Id. at 81.  When a site is 
finally agreed upon, which could take several days, the swarm of bees would fly to the new location 
within an hour.  Id. at 80.  This communicative strength is impressive, especially considering the 
bees’ short life span.  See id. at 78. 
  As a further testament to honeybees’ capacity for thought, they appear to be skeptics.  Id. at 
77.  Princeton biologist James Gould conducted an experiment by allowing bees to come find nectar 
in his boat, and then took the boat to the middle of a lake.  Id.  The bees were then allowed to return 
to their hive, where they communicated the location of the food.  Id.  However, unlike the normal 
reaction, the other bees did not head for the boat—they did not believe the message that the nectar 
could be in the middle of the water.  Id.  With these facts, it is hard to deny these small creatures at 
least some sense of awareness and consciousness. 
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research subjects.90  The report noted that “[c]himpanzees live in complex 
social groups characterized by considerable interindividual cooperation, 
altruism, deception, and cultural transmission of learned behavior (including 
tool use).”91  The committee that undertook the study was not asked to weigh 
the ethical concerns implicated in using chimpanzees for laboratory 
experimentation; however, the committee found that consideration of the 
ethical issues was inseparable from any analysis regarding the animals’ 
use.92  The committee stated that because of chimpanzees’ advanced 
cognitive functions and “genetic proximity to humans,” scientists should be 
required to produce a greater justification before using chimpanzees in 
experiments.93 
Recognizing that there were no existing criteria in place for deciding 
when it is appropriate to use chimpanzees in research, the committee met 
this need by designing a set of considerations.94  Although the specific 
criteria vary depending on the type of research, the report concluded that the 
determination of whether chimpanzees should be used in a given experiment 
should be guided by three principles: 
1. The knowledge gained must be necessary to advance the public’s 
health; 
2. There must be no other research model by which the knowledge 
could be obtained, and the research cannot be ethically performed 
on human subjects; and 
3. The animals used in the proposed research must be maintained 
either in ethologically appropriate physical and social environments 
or in natural habitats.95 
Using these principles, the committee made the determination that 
“most current use of chimpanzees for biomedical research is unnecessary . . . 
.”96  Technology has provided alternatives to the use of chimpanzees in 
 90.  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 20.  The National Academies are highly 
respected as “the nation’s premier source of independent, expert advice on scientific, engineering, 
and medical issues.”  See Our Reputation, THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 
http://www.nationalacademies.org/about/reputation/index.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 91.  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 20, at 27. 
 92.  Id. at 2.  The committee also agreed that cost should not factor in to the ethical 
considerations of using chimps in research.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 4. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.  The two possible exceptions listed are narrow.  Id.  First, although the development of 
monoclonal antibody therapies will not require the use of chimpanzees in the future, “there may be a 
limited number of monoclonal antibodies already in the developmental pipeline that may require the 
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biomedical experiments, and, given the moral reservations over using 
chimpanzees for such research, these alternatives should be used instead.97  
Further, the committee stated that even in the limited circumstances where 
the use of chimpanzees is necessary, practices should be conducted so as to 
minimize harm.98 
Therefore, the scientific community is recognizing the significance of 
animals’ advanced cognitive functioning and holding that this should have a 
strong impact on our uses and treatment of them.99  The legal community 
should do the same. 
III.  ESCAPING THROUGH THE ZOO BARS: CURRENT ANIMAL LAWS 
A.  Animal Welfare Legislation 
Animal welfare legislation has been incorporated at both the state and 
federal levels, but it has been criticized as lagging behind our modern 
knowledge of the type of protections animals deserve.100 
continued use of chimpanzees.”  Id.  Second, the committee was evenly split over whether 
chimpanzees were needed for a preclinical challenge study relating to the development of a 
prophylactic hepatitis C virus vaccine.  Id. at 5. 
 97.  See id.  Due to these technologies, the necessity of using chimpanzees will likely be even 
further reduced in the future.  Id. 
 98.  “It is generally accepted that all species, including our own, experience a chronic stress 
response . . . when deprived of usual habitats . . . .”  Id. at 27.  Thus, it is important to make an effort 
to minimize the animals’ suffering by keeping them in conditions that are as natural as possible.  See 
id. 
 99.  In light of the study, the National Institutes of Health, which fund much of the chimpanzee 
laboratory research in the United States, is ceasing the issuance of new funding for chimp research, 
at least temporarily until the processes for implementing the new criteria are in place.  Nell 
Greenfieldboyce, Biomedical Research Using Chimps Curtailed, NPR NEWS, Dec. 15, 2011, 
http://m.npr.org/news/Science/143764694. 
 100.  Appealing to human emotion and interests, many recent legal developments have focused on 
protecting household pets.  See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 387 
(2003) [hereinafter Sunstein, Rights].  The Uniform Trust Law and Uniform Probate Law have been 
amended to specifically allow wills and trusts to provide for the care of an animal.  David S. Favre, 
Judicial Recognition of the Interests of Animals—A New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 351 
(2005).  Pet owners are also beginning to attempt to win damages above the market value of their 
pets in lawsuits over their pets’ deaths, and prosecutors have increased prosecution for violations of 
animal cruelty statutes.  See id.  However, though research shows that there are many other animals 
possessing equal or greater intelligence and emotional capacity than our beloved pets, such animals 
are largely unprotected.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
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1.  Federal Regulation of Animal Practices 
Federal legislation regulates animal practices that affect interstate 
commerce, which include those used in scientific experimentation, 
entertainment, sale in the market, and in the food industry.  The Animal 
Welfare Act101 and the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act102 are designed to 
regulate these major areas of animal use.103  The Animal Welfare Act 
(AWA), which was first passed in 1966 and modified through subsequent 
amendments, was designed to “protect certain animals from inhumane 
treatment and neglect,”104 regulating the use of animals in research, and 
applying to animals used in exhibitions or being held for sale.105  However, 
scholars and advocates have criticized it for its ineffectiveness.106  The AWA 
only addresses the treatment of certain animals.  For non-research uses, it 
excludes horses and farm animals.107  For purposes of research, it notably 
excludes from statutory protection mice, rats, and birds—which comprise 
about ninety percent of the animals used in experimentation.108  Further, the 
AWA expressly denies any authority to actually interfere with laboratory 
experimentation.109 
 101.  7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2006). 
 102.  7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2006). 
 103.  Other federal acts aimed at the protection of animals include the Endangered Species Act 
and the Marine Mammals Protection Act.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1407 
(2006). 
 104.  Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Animal Welfare, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF AGRICULTURE, http://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/awa_info.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 
2013). 
 105.  7 U.S.C. § 2131.  It is left to the Secretary of Agriculture to set standards for the regulated 
facilities and conduct inspections.  See id. §§ 2131–2159. 
 106.  See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995); Taimie L. Bryant, 
Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status of Animals as 
Property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 247, 249–50 (2007–2008); Gary 
L. Francione, Reflections on Animals, Property, and the Law and Rain Without Thunder, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 
47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1334, 1342 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing]; Shigehiko Ito, 
Comment, Beyond Standing: A Search for a New Solution in Animal Welfare, 46 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 377 (2006); Katharine M. Swanson, Note, Carte Blanche for Cruelty: The Non-Enforcement of 
the Animal Welfare Act, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 937 (2002). 
 107.  7 U.S.C. § 2132(g).  Thus, it does not impose regulations on slaughterhouses. 
 108.  Id.; Bryant, supra note 106, at 249–50; Swanson, supra note 106, at 950–51.  When animal 
advocates pushed for the inclusion of mice, rats, and birds in the AWA, Congress amended it to 
explicitly exclude them.  Bryant, supra note 106, at 250. 
 109.  See Swanson, supra note 106, at 941–43.  The AWA states that “nothing in this chapter shall 
be construed as authorizing the Secretary to promulgate rules, regulations, or orders with regard to 
design, outlines, guidelines, or performance of actual research or experimentation.”  7 U.S.C. 
§2143(a)(6)(A); see also Swanson, supra note 106, at 940–43.  Additionally, painful procedures are 
still allowed in laboratory experiments on nonhuman animals without the administration of an 
anesthetic as long as such procedures are necessary to the experiment and the experimenter has 
“considered” alternatives.  7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(7)(A)–(B); see also Swanson, supra note 106, at 942–
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The Humane Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA) regulates the process 
of killing used in slaughterhouses.110  However, despite the requirement that 
the killing of livestock be “humane,” which the statute defines as rendering 
the animal “insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, 
chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, 
hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut,”111 a slaughterhouse is still “an unspeakably 
horrible place.”112  Further, the humane slaughter laws have been interpreted 
to apply to only five percent of the ten billion animals killed in the United 
States each year, because they exclude poultry.113 
2.  State Animal Abuse Statutes 
State animal welfare regulation mainly takes the form of animal abuse 
provisions in criminal statutes, which are aimed at punishing humans who 
abuse animals through intentional acts or neglect.114  Therefore, the laws can 
only be enforced through government prosecution.115  What constitutes 
criminal animal cruelty varies between states, but generally includes acts 
such as the unnecessary killing, injuring, or torturing of animals, as well as 
the failure to provide food, water, or necessary shelter to an animal within 
one’s custody.116  However, many state statutes exempt certain classes of 
43. 
 110.  See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2006). 
 111.  Id. § 1902. 
 112.  See Gary L. Francione & Anna E. Charlton, Animal Advocacy in the 21st Century: The 
Abolition of the Property Status of Nonhumans, in ANIMAL LAW AND THE COURTS: A READER 14 
(Taimie L. Bryant et al. eds., 2008); see also Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
May 15, 2003, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2003/may/15/animal-
liberation-at-30/?pagination=false (praising the improvements in animal welfare but noting that 
“[t]hese modest gains are dwarfed, however, by the huge increase in animals kept confined, some so 
tightly that they are unable to stretch their limbs or walk even a step or two, on America’s factory 
farms”).  The law does not regulate the practices that cause tremendous suffering to nonhuman 
animals as they are being raised for food production.  Bryant, supra note 106, at 252.  For instance, 
“veal calves are deliberately kept anemic, deprived of straw for bedding, and confined in individual 
crates so narrow that they cannot even turn around.”  Singer, supra. 
 113.  JORDAN CURNUTT, ANIMALS AND THE LAW: A SOURCEBOOK 169 (2001); Bryant, supra 
note 106, at 251.  While some states have enacted legislation addressing the humane slaughter of 
poultry, there is no such federal regulation.  See Jeff Welty, Humane Slaughter Laws, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 190–91, 201 (2007).  Federal regulation of poultry slaughter has been 
proposed but thus far rejected by Congress.  Id. at 201. 
 114.  See Rebecca F. Wisch, Overview of State Cruelty Laws, 
http://www.animallaw.info/topics/tabbed%20topic%20page/spuscruelty.htm (last updated 2010). 
 115.  Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 390. 
 116.  Id. at 389–90; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2910 (2012) (declaring that it is animal 
cruelty to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly subject “any animal under the person’s custody or 
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animals, such as farm animals, laboratory animals, and wildlife, leaving 
those animals unprotected under state anti-cruelty statutes.117 
Several states have also enacted other legislation, such as their own 
humane slaughter laws.118  However, in some circumstances, state law is 
preempted by federal legislation,119 leaving the states without power to enact 
stricter regulations.  The Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), a federal 
statutory scheme that regulates the inspection of slaughterhouse facilities,120 
contains an express preemption clause preventing states from enacting 
differing regulations pertaining to slaughterhouses.121  Accordingly, in 
control to cruel neglect or abandonment” or inflict “unnecessary physical injury to any animal”).  
State anti-cruelty laws have gradually been strengthened, reflecting an increased societal concern for 
animal wellbeing.  See Laurie Serafino, No Walk in the Dog Park: Drafting Animal Cruelty Statutes 
to Resolve Double Jeopardy Concerns and Eliminate Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 TENN. 
L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2011).  The laws have broadened to address more forms of abuse, such as 
cockfighting, reflecting a shift in purpose from historically protecting only humans’ economic 
interest in their animal property to modernly viewing the animals as the victims.  Id. at 1123–25.  
Additionally, forty-seven states have now made certain animal abuse violations felonies.  Animal 
Legal Defense Fund, U.S. Jurisdictions With and Without Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions, 
http://www.aldf.org/article.php?id=261 (last updated 2012); see, e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 
353-a (McKinney 1999) (“Aggravated cruelty to animals is a felony.”). 
 117.  Pamela D. Frasch et al., State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An Overview, 5 ANIMAL L. 69, 
75–79 (1999); Serafino, supra note 116, at 1133 (socially accepted practices such as research, 
slaughtering, and hunting are regularly exempted); Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 391; see, e.g., 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-18-1 (1978) (fishing, hunting, trapping, veterinary practices, rodent or pest 
control, farming, rodeo practices, and research are exempted from the cruelty statute).  Special 
interest groups such as agricultural lobbies and hunting associations push for these exemptions, and 
animal law has yielded to that political process.  See Frasch, supra, at 74. 
 118.  Welty, supra note 113, at 189 n.100.  State humane slaughter laws often mirror the HMSA.  
Id. 
 119.  The Supremacy Clause establishes that the Constitution and federal law are the supreme law 
of the land, and state law must yield to valid federal law whenever a conflict arises.  U.S. CONST. art. 
VI, cl. 2.  Federal law can preempt state law through express preemption, field preemption, and 
conflict preemption.  Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).  Express 
preemption occurs when “a federal statute includes a preemption clause explicitly withdrawing 
specified powers from the states.”  Id.  Field preemption occurs when federal regulation is “so 
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to 
supplement it.”  Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Nelson, supra, 
at 227.  Conflict preemption occurs when it is physically impossible to comply with both the federal 
and state law or when “state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”  Nelson, supra, at 228 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 120.  21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695 (2006).  In addition to setting guidelines for federal inspection of 
slaughterhouse facilities, the FMIA mandates the facilities to follow the federal standards for 
slaughter practices set forth in the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act.  Id. § 610(b); see supra notes 
109–12 and accompanying text.  Thus, it incorporates the HMSA without changing its standards for 
“humane” slaughter. 
 121.  21 U.S.C. § 678.  Other federal acts, such as the AWA, do not contain express preemption 
clauses, leaving the states with some power to regulate animal industries outside of slaughterhouses.  
7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2006).  Further, a finding that state law was preempted by a statute like the 
AWA through field or conflict preemption would be unlikely.  See supra note 118.  An argument for 
field preemption would fail because animal welfare is an issue largely left to the states, and 
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National Meat Association v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a 
California law prohibiting the use of non-ambulatory animals for slaughter 
was invalid because it was preempted by the FMIA.122  Following the 
Court’s decision, states may be left with very little power to improve 
conditions for slaughterhouse animals.123  Therefore, state law is inadequate 
in addressing the gaps in the federal legislation, due to both lackluster 
legislation and the inability to impose more rigorous laws. 
3.  The Ineffectiveness of the Federal and State Legislation 
Overall, both state and federal animal legislation share two main 
weaknesses.124  First, the laws are under-enforced.  At the state level, 
“Congress anticipated that states would remain active in this area of traditional state interest.”  Kerr 
v. Kimmell, 740 F. Supp. 1525, 1530 (D. Kan. 1990); see DeHart v. Town of Austin, Ind., 39 F.3d 
718, 722 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230–31 (1920)) (“The 
regulation of animals has long been recognized as part of the historic police power of the States.”).  
A finding of conflict preemption would be unlikely because state and federal statutes would 
generally “work in concert for their mutual purpose of protecting animals.”  Zimmerman v. Wolff, 
622 F. Supp. 2d 240, 248 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that federal licensing of dog breeders under the 
AWA did not preempt state dog breeder licensing and regulations); see generally Am. Canine 
Found. v. Sun, 2007 WL 4208358, at *4–*5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2007) (holding that the AWA did 
not preempt state law requiring licensing for dogs that are not spayed or neutered). 
 122.  132 S. Ct. 965 (2012).  The California law prohibited the use of non-ambulatory animals, 
requiring instead that they be humanely euthanized.  Id. at 970.  Conversely, the federal scheme 
allows non-ambulatory animals that are categorized as “suspect” to be monitored and then 
slaughtered as long as the animal is not reclassified as “condemned.”  Id. at 969.  The Court held that 
the FSIA expressly preempted the California law.  Id. at 970.  In doing so, it stated that “[t]he 
FMIA’s preemption clause sweeps widely . . . prevent[ing] a State from imposing any additional or 
different—even if non-conflicting—requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and concern a 
slaughterhouse’s facilities or operations.”  Id. 
 123.  Following National Meat Association, it seems apparent that state versions of humane 
slaughter laws could be open to challenge based on preemption.  Therefore, states could be 
prevented from imposing more humane regulations on slaughterhouses.  For example, the Court’s 
opinion suggests that a state attempt to require more humane slaughter techniques would likewise be 
preempted, because the federal scheme regulates these techniques. 
  State expansion of the animals that are covered by humane slaughter laws, such as the 
inclusion of poultry, may also be jeopardized.  See supra note 119 and accompanying text.  There 
may be an argument that this is distinguishable since the HMSA does not regulate the slaughter of 
animals such as poultry.  See id.  However, since the HMSA defines what animals are to be included 
within slaughterhouse regulations, a court could alternatively find that Congress has addressed this 
issue and that any state laws are accordingly preempted.  See 7 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006). 
 124.  See Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and 
Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 175–76 (2001) (describing inadequacies in the substantive 
provisions and non-enforcement as weaknesses of the AWA); Cynthia Hodges, Detailed Discussion 
of the Humane Methods of Slaughter Act, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER (2010), available 
at http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ddushmsa.htm (naming exemptions to the provisions and lack 
of enforcement as weaknesses of the HMSA). 
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prosecutors must choose to press criminal charges to enforce the laws.125  
They may be less likely to prosecute animal crimes due to limited resources, 
inexperience, or pressure to focus on other crimes.126  At the federal level, 
the AWA and HMSA do not have citizen suit provisions, leaving 
enforcement solely to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
which has not made inspections and enforcement a priority.127  To reduce the 
cost of enforcement of slaughterhouse regulations, Congress has delegated 
the inspection of slaughterhouse practices to existing inspectors within the 
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service, whose primary purpose is to 
ensure the safety of meat to consumers.128  As a result, inspectors are 
overburdened and not specifically trained in the enforcement of humane 
slaughter regulations.129  Further, critics have scorned the USDA for being 
tolerant of animal law violations because it is allied with the meat 
industry.130 
Second, the laws are too narrow in practice.  Laboratories and 
 125.  See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 126.  Frasch, supra note 117, at 69–70. 
 127.  See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907, 2131–2159 (2006); Bryant, supra note 106, at 250; see, e.g., 
Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Inst. for Behavioral Research, Inc., 799 F.2d 934, 940 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that the AWA does not create a private cause of action).  This is in contrast to 
environmental statutes that generally have citizen suit provisions, such as the Clean Water Act and 
Clean Air Act.  33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
  In 2002, in response to news accounts of the lack of enforcement of the HMSA, Congress 
added language into the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 expressing the sentiment 
that the USDA should fully enforce the HMSA (even though it was already supposed to be doing 
so).  Welty, supra note 113, at 187.  However, stories of weak enforcement still abound. 
  Violations of the HMSA received national attention in 2008 after an undercover investigation 
by the Humane Society of the United States revealed illegal practices in a randomly selected 
slaughterhouse, showing footage of workers in the slaughterhouse using “electric shock on various 
parts of cows’ bodies and . . . high pressure water hoses to force water into the nostrils and mouths in 
attempts to force non-ambulatory cows to move.”  Bryant, supra note 106, at 251–52; see also Rick 
Weiss, Video Reveals Violations of Laws, Abuse of Cows at Slaughterhouse, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 
2008, at A4; Julie Schmit, USDA Will Step Up Inspections at Slaughterhouses, USA TODAY, Feb. 
18, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/food/2008-02-18-meat-recall_N.htm.  The 
Humane Society also caught footage of the slaughterhouse forcing downed cows to slaughter with 
the use of electric prods and a forklift, despite the fact that a USDA inspector was in charge of 
inspecting the plant.  Schmit, supra.  The slaughterhouse failed to report any violations, and the 
inspector showed up predictably at the same times each day, allowing the violations to remain 
hidden.  Id. 
 128.  Welty, supra note 113, at 194–95. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  GAIL A. EISNITZ, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: THE SHOCKING STORY OF GREED, NEGLECT, AND 
INHUMANE TREATMENT INSIDE THE U.S. MEAT INDUSTRY 24 (1997); Kolber, supra note 124, at 176 
(quoting GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 211 (1995)) (prior to its 
responsibility in enforcing the AWA and HMSA, the USDA “‘dealt primarily with the production, 
treatment, and slaughter of food animals’”); Donna Mo, Unhappy Cows and Unfair Competition: 
Using Unfair Competition Laws to Fight Farm Animal Abuse, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2005).  
The USDA initially opposed the HMSA, but is now responsible for policing it.  EISNITZ, supra, at 
24. 
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slaughterhouses may find themselves exempt from regulation at the state 
level.131  Many animals are further excluded from regulatory protection 
within the federal statutes.132  At a conceptual level, animal welfare 
regulation tends to protect against only “unnecessary” animal suffering.133  
This approach may seem an ideal way to balance the protection of animals 
with human interests—for example, an experiment that has the potential to 
save millions of human lives could be a “necessary” use of an animal, while 
the statutes should minimize animal suffering whenever possible.  However, 
in practice, this mindset has resulted in animal protection yielding to the 
political process and to the industries that use animals, which are 
categorically accepted as necessary.134  The industries are often allowed to 
set their own standards for the treatment of the animals.  Research facilities 
are able to make their own determinations of what is scientifically 
“necessary.”135  Slaughterhouses have minimal regulations with regard to 
procedures and the size of cages, but these are generally rules that the food 
industry itself has agreed to—preventing animals from getting too sick 
improves the taste of the food, boosting sales.136  Therefore, current animal 
legislation does not allow for a true weighing of human and nonhuman 
interests. 
B.  Seeking Judicial Protection 
Animal advocates have begun an attempt to address these legislative 
weaknesses through the use of the courts, with an equity argument that 
animals deserve to have rights of their own.137  In October 2011, People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed a lawsuit against SeaWorld, 
 131.  See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text. 
 132.  See supra notes 101–13 and accompanying text. 
 133.  See Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 7. 
 134.  State anti-cruelty statutes generally prohibit only “unnecessary” harm to animals, leaving 
traditional animal uses like food and hunting intact, or provide justification defenses for those uses.  
See supra note 117 and accompanying text.  Likewise, the federal legislation only attempts to 
prohibit “inhumane” procedures for accomplishing the industries’ uses of animals.  See supra notes 
111–12 and accompanying text.  However, to be “humane” the procedures only need to meet 
minimal standards, without questioning the necessity of industry practices.  See supra notes 109, 
111–12 and accompanying text. 
 135.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 136.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 12–14. 
 137.  Dubbed the animal rights movement, this theory, as an effort to ensure that animals’ most 
basic interests are protected, has been pervading animal law discussion.  See generally GARY L. 
FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995); TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL 
RIGHTS (1983); SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (1975); WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1. 
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naming five captive orcas as the plaintiffs.138  PETA sought constitutional 
rights for the plaintiffs based on a Thirteenth Amendment claim, arguing 
that the Thirteenth Amendment “prohibits the conditions of slavery and 
involuntary servitude without regard to the identity of the victim and without 
reference to ‘persons.’”139  The plaintiffs alleged both slavery and 
involuntary servitude, pleading that the plaintiffs were plucked from their 
families to be kept in small tanks and forced to perform unnatural tricks for 
SeaWorld customers.140  The complaint pled facts demonstrating the 
sophisticated intelligence, emotions, social dependency, and cultural traits of 
orcas.141  Yet, it alleged, being captured from their families in the wild and 
confined in small tanks with unnatural socialization has caused the whales to 
suffer psychological distress.142  For instance, Tilikum, one of the plaintiffs, 
has suffered cuts from rubbing against the sides of a small metal tank.143  
Boredom and incompatible social groupings have caused him to gnaw on his 
metal enclosure, resulting in broken teeth, “leaving the pulp exposed and 
producing chronic pain.”144  The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment and 
an injunction, which would allow them to be moved to suitable conditions.145  
The Southern District of California dismissed the suit for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to apply only to 
 138.  Complaint, Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. SeaWorld 
Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11CV2476JM(WMC)), 2011 WL 
5077854; see also David Crary & Julie Watson, PETA Lawsuit Seeks to Expand Animal Rights, 
YAHOO! NEWS, Oct. 25, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/peta-lawsuit-seeks-expand-animal-rights-
222219887.html; James McWilliams, How PETA’s Lawsuit Against Sea World Could End Factory 
Farming, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 11, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/life/archive/2011/11/how-
petas-lawsuit-against-sea-world-could-end-factory-farming/248127/. 
 139.  Complaint ¶ 104, Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (No. 11CV2476JM(WMC)).  Section 1 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment states: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 140.  Complaint ¶¶ 101–11, Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (No. 11CV2476JM(WMC)). 
 141.  Id. ¶¶ 10–18. 
 142.  Id. ¶¶ 19, 21, 23.  This stress is evidenced by behavior such as abnormal and repetitive 
movements, “unresponsiveness . . . , self-inflicted physical trauma and mutilation, stress-induced 
vomiting, compromised immunology, and excessive aggressiveness towards other orcas and 
humans.”  Id. ¶ 23.  The complaint asserts that this stress is what has led to the accounts of attacks 
on human handlers.  Id. ¶ 24.  In fact, named plaintiff Tilikum is the orca responsible for killing 
SeaWorld trainer Dawn Brancheau in 2010.  See, e.g., Tilikum, orca that killed SeaWorld Orlando 
trainer, will remain at the park despite calls to free him, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/unleashed/2010/02/tilikum-orca-killer-whale-sea-world-
orlando.html.  There is not a single account of an attack on a human by an orca in the wild, despite 
the fact that researchers have come very close to orcas for observation.  Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 
24. 
 143.  Complaint ¶ 33, Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (No. 11CV2476JM(WMC)). 
 144.  Id. ¶ 43.  “Tilikum no longer has teeth on his bottom jaw.”  Id. 
 145.  Id. ¶ 2. 
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humans.146  However, there will undoubtedly be future attempts to secure 
greater protection for animals through the courts.147 
IV.  A NEW BREED OF IDEAS 
Animal law scholars and activists are gaining momentum in their push 
to bring animal concerns to the forefront of our current legal debate.148  
Advocates can be divided into two basic camps: those seeking to reduce the 
suffering of nonhuman animals through welfare laws and those arguing that 
nonhuman animals should be granted rights.149 
First, there are several groups that have taken a “welfare” approach and 
focused their efforts on reforming the animal welfare laws.150  This approach 
attempts to incrementally improve the conditions to which we subject 
nonhuman animals.151  It would involve adjusting state anti-cruelty laws as 
well as federal legislation such as the AWA and HMSA to include stricter 
standards and protection for more animals.152  To address the problem of 
non-enforcement, welfare-based solutions could include pushing for better 
inspections and greater publicity of violations,153 and reforming the AWA 
 146.  Tilikum, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1263–64.  The court held that, within its historical context, the 
Thirteenth Amendment was intended only to apply to humans.  Id.  It further stated that, unlike other 
constitutional amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment targets the single issue of slavery, and thus 
cannot be expanded to fit the “changing conditions and evolving norms of our society,” because 
“‘slavery’ and ‘involuntary servitude’ are uniquely human activities.”  Id. at 1264.  This could leave 
the door open for similar claims to be brought under other constitutional provisions. 
 147.  Steven M. Wise and his team have also been preparing to bring a lawsuit arguing for rights 
for certain animals, such as those in the cetacean community, by arguing that they should be 
considered “persons.”  Interview by ZoeNature.org of Steven M. Wise, Professor, Harvard Law 
School (Oct. 26, 2010), The Case for Basic Dolphin Rights, available at 
http://www.zoenature.org/2010/10/dolphins-legal-rights/.  Of these efforts, Wise stated: “Our 
purpose is to either win those cases or to lose them in a way in which we can understand how to win 
the next one.  And if we lose that one, then we’ll understand how to win the next one, and then the 
next one.”  Id. 
 148.  When Katharine T. Bartlett, former Dean of Duke University School of Law, was posed 
with the question of what issue, in twenty years, people will pick out as a single important issue that 
should have been given more attention, she pointed to animal law.  David J. Wolfson, Confronting 
Barriers to the Courtroom for Animal Advocates, 13 ANIMAL L. 123, 127 (2006). 
 149.  BRUCE A. WAGMAN & MATTHEW LIEBMAN, A WORLDVIEW OF ANIMAL LAW 19–20 
(2011) (summarizing the difference between the welfare approach and the rights approach to animal 
protection); Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 11–12. 
 150.  These include organizations such as The Humane Society of the United States and People 
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).  See Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 11. 
 151.  See id.; WAGMAN & LIEBMAN, supra note 149, at 19–20. 
 152.  See supra notes 124–36 and accompanying text. 
 153.  Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 393 (suggesting, as a “minimal reform step,” a system 
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and HMSA to include private causes of action, allowing citizens to bring 
suits for suspected violations.154 
On the other hand, following the trend of trying to bypass weak 
legislation by appealing to the judicial system for greater animal protections, 
several animal law scholars have begun to argue for a “rights” approach.155  
Rights-based theories contend that nonhuman animals deserve certain basic 
rights, such as the right against bodily harm.156  Once an animal has a 
positive right, that right could be asserted as against humans.157  This would 
override laws such as the AWA, HMSA, and anti-cruelty statutes, allowing 
animals to stand on their own feet under the law. 
Within a rights paradigm, rights theorists vary in their opinions of which 
animals should receive rights and which rights to grant those animals.  First, 
there are several places where rights-bearers and non-rights-bearers could be 
divided.  Currently, humans possess rights and nonhumans do not.158  
However, this is an arbitrary division that can be shifted.  Many animal 
rights advocates assert that all sentient beings deserve rights.159  To be 
sentient one must have conscious awareness, which means the ability to 
think and feel.160  This is generally equated to granting rights to animals that 
have a capacity to suffer—a division that these advocates contend is the 
most fair. 161  Other commentators advocate a middle ground, giving rights to 
certain animals that have heightened cognitive abilities that make them 
similar to humans, thus making it irrational to exclude them from sharing in 
any basic rights.162  This could include animals that are self-aware, that 
possess theory of mind, or that have any other category of attributes.163 
that mandates companies to disclose their animal treatment practices). 
 154.  Ito, supra note 106, at 378. 
 155.  See supra note 138–39. 
 156.  See, e.g., Steven M. Wise, Legal Personhood and the Nonhuman Rights Project, 17 ANIMAL 
L. 1, 3 (2010) [hereinafter Wise, Legal Personhood].  The rights approach diverges from a welfare 
approach in that the focus is on the animal as the bearer of a right, whereas the welfare approach 
centers on humans and their social responsibility toward animals.  Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Moving 
Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 31 (2009) 
[hereinafter Cupp, Moving Beyond]. 
 157.  See Wise, Legal Personhood, supra note 156, at 3. 
 158.  Animals currently have certain protections under the law, which punish humans for the 
unlawful treatment of animals.  See supra notes 101–23 and accompanying text.  However, this is 
distinguished from an affirmative right, which an animal could assert as a plaintiff in court.  Wise, 
Legal Personhood, supra note 156, at 3. 
 159.  See SINGER, supra note 137; Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 19–20. 
 160.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 7.  Most animals are included within this 
definition.  See id. 
 161.  Philosopher Jeremy Bentham first said that “the question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can 
they talk?  But, Can they suffer?”  JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 310–11 n.1 (Prometheus 1988). 
 162.  See WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14; WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1. 
 163.  See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.  Due to their heightened intelligence, the 
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Next, there is a range of rights that could be granted.  Animal rights 
activists do not propose that all animals have the full extent of rights as do 
normal, adult humans.  Like human children, a great ape will not be placing 
a vote in the next presidential election.  Animals could be given rights such 
as bodily integrity or bodily liberty, which would prevent humans from 
physically hurting animals or confining them,164 or a right to life or to be free 
from torture.  Alternatively, rights could be granted on a sliding scale, with 
the animals possessing the highest cognitive capacity holding greater rights 
and animals with a lesser capacity holding fewer rights.165 
Notwithstanding the common goal of improved conditions for animals, 
there is heated debate between welfarists and rights theorists over whether 
animals should have rights.166  Arguments on both sides range from 
philosophical to legal.167  Rights proponents argue that if rights are given to 
infants and incompetent adults, or those in comas, then they should also be 
granted to animals functioning at a higher level than those individuals.168  
This demonstrates the arbitrariness and potential unfairness of a sharp line 
drawn between human and nonhuman.  Further, rights are assigned to even 
non-living things such as corporations, showing legal precedent for 
nonhuman rights.169  Opponents of animal rights respond that rights for 
things like corporations are legal fictions designed to protect the rights of the 
human efforts behind them, and are distinguishable from granting rights to 
animals on their own accord.170  Opponents also assert that this comparison 
great apes, cetaceans, and elephants would likely be included as rights-holders.  See supra notes 18–
69 and accompanying text.  See generally WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14.  These types of 
rights would seriously limit human use of the rights-bearing animals, which some scholars argue is 
an appropriate goal.  See Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 19. 
  Steven Wise argues for basic rights for all animals with “practical autonomy.”  WISE, 
DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 32.  He defines practical autonomy as the ability to (1) desire, 
(2) intentionally try to fulfill that desire, and (3) possess a sense of self-sufficiency that allows the 
animal (human or nonhuman) to understand “that it is she who wants something and it is she who is 
trying to get it.”  Id. 
 164.  Wise, Legal Personhood, supra note 156, at 3. 
 165.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 286. 
 166.  See Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 388.  “Some advocates of animal rights think that 
their adversaries are selfish, unthinking, cruel, even morally blind.  Some of those who oppose 
animal rights think that the advocates are fanatical and even bizarre, willing to trample on important 
human interests for the sake of rats and mice and salmon.”  Id. 
 167.  This Section serves to provide only a superficial overview of a complex debate. 
 168.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 185. 
 169.  Gary L. Francione, Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 397, 435 
(1996). 
 170.  Richard L. Cupp, Jr., A Dubious Grail: Seeking Tort Law Expansion and Limited 
Personhood As Stepping Stones Toward Abolishing Animals’ Property Status, 60 SMU L. REV. 3, 
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is dangerous because it could serve only to lessen protections for those 
humans considered to be at a “lower” level than animals.171 
Proponents of animal rights cite to modern scientific knowledge as 
completely rebutting the historical beliefs that justified granting rights only 
to humans.172  Our Western precedent is rooted in the ancient beliefs that 
“lower” beings exist for the sake of humans, and that animals do not have 
the capacity to think or feel.173  Since we now know that the differences 
between humans and at least some nonhumans are “quantitative and not 
qualitative,” there is no good reason why animals should not be included as 
rights-bearers.174  The term “speciesism” has been coined to connote the 
belief that arbitrary discrimination underlies our mistreatment of animals.175  
Conversely, opponents of animal rights look to the social contract theory as 
a reason for drawing a sharp line between human and nonhuman.176  In this 
view, the foundation for our civilization is based upon a pairing of rights and 
responsibilities—in order to gain the rights and protections that come with 
being a member of society, we also undertake responsibilities and give up 
some freedoms.177  Since animals do not have the moral capacity to 
18 (2007) [hereinafter Cupp, A Dubious Grail]. 
 171.  Cupp, Moving Beyond, supra note 156, at 76–77. 
 172.  See, e.g., WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14. 
 173.  Early Western philosophers imagined a world designed solely for humans.  WISE, RATTLING 
THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 11.  Socrates believed that animals and nature existed for humans, and 
Aristotle conceptualized nature as being designed like a ladder.  Id.  These beliefs led to the concept 
of a “Great Chain of Being,” where humans put themselves ahead of other beings in a hierarchical 
stepladder, with the lower beings designed to serve the higher ones.  Id.  Later philosophers such as 
Immanuel Kant continued to deny animals the capacity for any sort of rational thought.  Sunstein, 
Rights, supra note 100, at 387.  The conception of animals as lower rungs on a chain persisted in 
Western thought until almost a century ago.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 11.  
However, these types of historic beliefs are rebutted by our current scientific knowledge of animals’ 
cognitive abilities.  See supra notes 18–88 and accompanying text. 
 174.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 19; see supra notes 13–89 and accompanying text.  
Giving animals rights in the United States would not be unprecedented.  “In 2002, Germany became 
the first European nation to vote to guarantee animal rights in its constitution, adding the words ‘and 
the animals’ to a clause that obliges the state to respect and protect the dignity of human beings.”  
Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 388.  The Indian Constitution states that “[i]t shall be the 
fundamental duty of every citizen of India . . . to protect and improve the natural environment 
including forests, lakes, rivers and wild life, and to have compassion for living creatures.”  WAGMAN 
& LIEBMAN, supra note 149, at 34 (quoting CONST. OF INDIA art. 51–A(g)). 
 175.  See The Ethics of Speciesism, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/animals/rights/speciesism.s 
tml (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).  This term reflects the idea that discrimination and mistreatment of 
animals is not unlike other forms of bias, such as that based on gender or race.  It is the natural 
reaction that those in charge of making a division of rights assign themselves to the group at the top, 
pushing others down below.  WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE, supra note 1, at 13 (“No one ever, ever, 
assigns a group to which he or she belongs to any place in a hierarchy of rights other than the top.”).  
This type of discrimination may be especially hard for animals to overcome, because they do not 
have a voice of their own, relying instead on humans to advocate for them.  See id. at 13–14. 
 176.  See Cupp, A Dubious Grail, supra note 170, at 28–30. 
 177.  Id. at 28. 
06 RICE SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/13  8:23 PM 
[Vol. 40: 1103, 2013] Letting the Apes Run the Zoo 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1129 
undertake such responsibilities, opponents argue, they do not deserve to be 
given rights.178  The social contract argument, however, may be refuted, as 
some scientists declare that there is growing evidence to show that other 
species have a sense of morality, and that their social groups, like human 
societies, are governed by moral codes.179  Under a social contract theory, to 
the extent that animals consciously exhibit morals in their interactions with 
humans, it could be argued that humans should have a duty to reciprocate.  
For instance, if scientists can say that predator animals refrain from killing 
unless it is necessary, then the human practice of hunting for pleasure may 
breach a moral code. 
There may be no clear answer to the debate.  However, the real reason 
for denying rights is probably more practical than theoretical: the 
corresponding ramifications make broad rights for animals a currently 
unattainable goal. 
V.  CAN WE SPARE THE ZOO KEY? 
A.  The Rights Approach 
Granting animals rights would have immense ramifications, depending 
on the scope of the rights that are given and the breadth of animals that are 
included as rights-holders.  This is because “rights exist in competition with 
other rights”—granting new rights to animals would impair the ways in 
which we currently use animals as property.180  It would not currently be 
feasible to extend a wide spectrum of rights to all sentient animals, mainly 
for economic reasons.181  In 2010, the beef industry alone was valued at $74 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Richard Gray, Animals Can Tell Right From Wrong, THE TELEGRAPH, May 23, 2009, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/wildlife/5373379/Animals-can-tell-right-from-wrong.html.  In his 
controversial book Wild Justice, Marc Bekoff, an ecologist at the University of Colorado, Boulder, 
contends that animal behavior research indicates that animals, from mice to primates, have moral 
codes that allow even competitive animals to live together in groups.  MARC BEKOFF & JESSICA 
PIERCE, WILD JUSTICE: THE MORAL CODE OF ANIMALS 18–19 (2009).  Bekoff says the research 
shows that animals “have an innate sense of fairness, display empathy and help other animals that 
are in distress.”  Gray, supra.  They may even be able to empathize with the suffering of other 
species.  Id.  This helps explain anecdotes such as that of dolphins helping humans escape from 
sharks.  Id. 
 180.  Cupp, A Dubious Grail, supra note 170, at 26–27. 
 181.  Steven Wise, advocating for rights for certain animals, admits that granting rights to all 
animals would be impractical.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 34 (“If I were Chief 
Justice of the Universe, I might make the simpler capacity to suffer, rather than practical autonomy, 
sufficient for personhood and dignity rights.”). 
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billion, with the U.S. consuming 26.4 billion pounds of beef.182  The use of 
animal products is so widespread that most other consumer products would 
also be eradicated.183  Gradually, many of these materials could be replaced, 
but it would be best left to the political and legislative processes to 
implement those policy trends.184  Courthouses would struggle, at best, to 
  Perhaps economic concerns should not serve as a barrier to morally correct action.  See 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 20, at 2 (deciding that costs should not be a 
consideration when determining whether chimpanzees are necessary in research).  However, from a 
practical standpoint, economic considerations and feasibility tend to matter a great deal.  “[T]he law 
represents what is politically and financially feasible at a moment in time.”  David S. Favre, Judicial 
Recognition of the Interests of Animals—A New Tort, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 333, 350 (2005). 
  In this sense, animal rights advocates have compared the current struggle toward rights for 
animals with the civil rights movement.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 10–19; 
Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 389 (asserting that in one hundred years, current uses of animals 
may well be seen as “a form of unconscionable barbarity,” making an analogy to slavery 
appropriate).  African-Americans were considered by law to be property that could possess no legal 
right, much as animals are now.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 16.  In the infamous 
opinion of Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Supreme Court found that blacks were “beings of an inferior 
order,” and could be “treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit 
could be made by it.”  60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).  This case is now cited as one of the worst Supreme 
Court decisions in our history.  See Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 13 (2011).  As societal values changed, so did the law regarding slaves.  However, 
this took far longer than it should have, because abruptly shutting down the slave trade, which was a 
very profitable business, would have economic ramifications.  WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra 
note 14, at 14.  It is now evident that the slavery of humans was not justified, even though it may 
have profited the groups of people who placed themselves above those who were enslaved.  
Similarly, in theory, the mistreatment of animals should not be justified only by the fact that it 
provides an economic benefit.  See id. at 16. 
 182.  United States Department of Agriculture, U.S. Beef and Cattle Industry: Background 
Statistics and Information, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, http://www.ers.usda.gov/news/BSECov 
erage.htm.  Apart from weighing the economic concerns, the meat industry should not be a barrier to 
animal protections, because eating meat is not necessary.  An expert panel for the United Nations 
declared the world’s current meat and dairy diet unsustainable, encouraging a shift to vegan diets as 
“vital to save the world from hunger, fuel poverty and the worst impacts of climate change.”  
Felicity Carus, UN Urges Global Move to Meat and Dairy-Free Diet, THE GUARDIAN, June 2, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jun/02/un-report-meat-free-diet. 
 183.  See WISE, DRAWING THE LINE, supra note 14, at 10. 
[T]oday the use of nonhuman animal products is so diverse and widespread that it is 
impossible to live in modern society and not support the nonhuman animal industry 
directly.  For example, the blood of a slaughtered cow is used to manufacture plywood 
adhesives, fertilizer, fire extinguisher foam, and dyes.  Her fat helps make plastic, tires, 
crayons, cosmetics, lubricants, soaps, detergents, cough syrup, contraceptive jellies and 
creams, ink, shaving cream, fabric softeners, synthetic rubber, jet engine lubricants, 
textiles, corrosion inhibitors, and metal-machining lubricants.  Her collagen is found in 
pie crusts, yogurts, matches, bank notes, paper, and cardboard glue; her intestines are 
used in strings for musical instruments and racquets; her bones in charcoal ash for 
refining sugar, in ceramics, and cleaning and polishing compounds. 
Id. at 10–11. 
 184.  See, e.g., John Vidal, The Future of Food, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 21, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/jan/22/future-of-food-john-
vidal?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487. 
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handle the burden of litigation surrounding mistreated animals.185  Finally, if 
courts granted rights to animals, manufacturers would simply move to other 
jurisdictions or countries for their operations, hurting the American economy 
while achieving little for animal protection.186 
By reducing the spectrum of rights that are granted and the animals that 
qualify as rights-holders, the burden on society would become much more 
reasonable.  For example, granting rights to only the great apes, cetaceans, 
and elephants would be feasible, because society is not dependent on their 
use.187  However, it is warranted for courts to remain wary of the unintended 
consequences of even this limited scope of rights.  Granting an animal an 
affirmative right could result in difficult decisions later if that animal’s rights 
conflict with important human interests.  For example, if great apes are 
granted a right such as freedom from bodily harm, and there becomes a 
subsequent scientific need for the use of an ape in an invasive experiment 
that is likely to save millions of human lives, many people would assert that 
the human interest should outweigh the ape’s interest.188  However, since the 
 185.  See Cupp, A Dubious Grail, supra note 170, at 42–43.  An estimated twenty-five to twenty-
eight billion animals are killed each year for human use in the United States, and another twenty 
million are used in research.  Id.  “[T]he potential number of . . . plaintiffs in the United States would 
instantly grow from our current 300 million human citizens (in addition to our corporations, foreign 
plaintiffs, etc.) to well over 25 billion.”  Id. at 43. 
  However, it may be unfair to give animals and humans equal weight in the burden they 
would place on the legal system.  First, animals would have a very limited number of causes of 
action at their disposal, unlike human plaintiffs.  Second, litigation would only be flowing in one 
direction, up to human defendants.  Animals would not be bringing causes of action against one 
another, as humans do.  Third, the main targets in the litigation would be the handful of corporations 
and laboratories that inflict most of the harm.  Thus, it would only take a few class action lawsuits, 
naming an entire species as a class, to set precedents and regulate the behavior of these industries.  
Fourth, the floodgates of litigation could be controlled, such as by limiting who could be designated 
as the representative to bring the suit on behalf of the animals. 
 186.  WAGMAN & LIEBMAN, supra note 149, at 11.  Therefore, change would need to occur on a 
worldwide scale, such as through international treaties, or accompanied by strict regulations on 
imports.  See id.  This would require action by the Executive and Legislative Branches, which are 
unlikely to disregard the animal industries’ political influences. 
 187.  The great apes, formerly used as an ideal model in experimentation, are no longer necessary 
for most research.  See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.  Cetaceans and elephants are 
mainly used in exhibition, which is an unnecessary human luxury. 
 188.  In its report on the necessity of using chimpanzees in experimentation, the National 
Academy of Sciences left open the possibility that in rare cases chimpanzees could be necessary in 
future research.  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 20, at 65.  Due to their genetic 
proximity to humans, chimpanzees have a unique value as research subjects.  Id. at 2.  In most cases, 
particularly with the use of new and developing technology, alternative models are sufficient for 
experiments; however, a new health epidemic could present an exception.  Id. at 5. 
  The European Union, which banned the use of great apes in research, includes a safeguard 
clause in its directive, stating that the use of great apes is permitted when research is “aimed at the 
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ape would have an affirmative right to be free from that harm, scientists 
would be barred from using the ape.  Therefore, it is necessary to find a 
feasible method that could balance animal protection with the concern of 
avoiding onerous ramifications.189 
B.  The Welfare Approach 
Reformation of state anti-cruelty laws and federal legislation has 
gradually improved conditions for animals, and continuing this path of 
development could serve to protect animals without an upheaval of societal 
practices.190  However, some scholars argue that by remaining within these 
current legal parameters, with animals lacking rights of their own, no real 
change is possible.191  Thus, our treatment of animals will never catch up to 
our moral and scientific knowledge.192 
The problem is that improvements in animal laws may be driven more 
by human self-interest than a legitimate concern for animal welfare.  A 
major development in state anti-cruelty laws has been heightened penalties, 
with states beginning to turn the most heinous animal abuses into felonies.193  
However, a main goal for these reforms may have been to target violence 
against humans: the changes were correlated with a series of studies that 
found animal abusers more likely to commit violent crimes against 
humans.194 
The same is true in the food industry.  The enactment of the HMSA was 
really justified by the fact that it increased worker safety and reduced carcass 
damage, saving the industry money.195  McDonalds was praised for setting 
new standards for slaughterhouses, with mild improvements in their 
treatment of the animals, but the drive behind this decision was the fact that 
preservation of those species or where action in relation to a potentially life-threatening, debilitating 
condition endangering human beings is warranted, and no other species or alternative method would 
suffice in order to achieve the aims of the procedure.”  Id. at 16–17. 
 189.  See Sunstein, Rights, supra note 100, at 394 (advocating a balancing of human and animal 
interests, based on values and scientific facts, before deciding to implement regulations on animal 
use). 
 190.  See Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL L. 
131, 131–42 (2005) (discussing improvements in state anti-cruelty laws, such as the addition of 
felony-level crimes and sentencing guidelines); Swanson, supra note 106, at 939–43 (describing the 
evolution of the AWA). 
 191.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 12. 
 192.  See supra Part II; see, e.g., Thomas I. White, Ethical Implications of Dolphin Intelligence: 
Dolphins as Nonhuman Persons (Abstract), AAAS 2010 ANNUAL MEETING, 
http://aaas.confex.com/aaas/2010/webprogram/Paper1489.html (claiming that dolphins should 
“qualify for moral standing as individuals” based on their similarities with humans). 
 193.  Frasch, supra note 117, at 70; see supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 194.  Frasch, supra note 117, at 70. 
 195.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 12–13. 
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McDonalds discovered that it would help economically.196  Even slight 
improvements in the treatment of slaughterhouse animals lead to improved 
meat quality.197  There is also a developing niche market for items like “free-
range” and “organic” products, which are advertised as healthier and more 
humane.198  These products sell because some consumers are willing to pay 
more for them; however, industry-wide change is unlikely because 
producers and many consumers would fight against increased costs.199 
Overall, a welfare approach will cause animal protections to remain 
subject to political influences rather than current scientific and moral 
standards.  Therefore, a balancing method between the potentially drastic 
ramifications of a broad rights approach and the ineffectiveness of the 
welfare approach is necessary. 
VI.  USING TORT LAW TO BALANCE HUMAN AND NONHUMAN INTERESTS 
A.  Using a Tort Approach 
David Favre, professor at Michigan State University College of Law, 
has suggested the use of a new tort cause of action as a middle ground 
between the rights and welfare approaches to animal law.200  This would 
provide a controlled scheme for balancing competing human and nonhuman 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See id. at 14.  About reforms in the livestock industry, the Los Angeles Times commented, 
“In part, the reforms are driven by self-interest.  When an animal is bruised, its flesh turns mushy 
and must be discarded.  Even stress, especially right before slaughter, can affect the quality of meat.”  
Id. at 13–14 (citing Stephanie Simon, Killing Them Softly: Voluntary Reforms in the Livestock 
Industry Have Changed the Way Animals Are Slaughtered, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A10). 
 198.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 12, 16.  An advertisement like “free-range” does 
not always mean improved conditions for the animals.  How Free is “Free-Range”?, COMPASSION 
OVER KILLING, http://www.cok.net/lit/freerange.php (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).  There is no federal 
regulation restricting which eggs can be labeled free-range, so hens are typically still crowded into a 
shed, with a narrow exit to a little outdoor enclosure, only big enough to fit some of the birds.  Id.  
Since the male chicks cannot lay eggs, they are killed, often by being ground alive or thrown into 
trash bags to suffocate.  Id.  The only restriction the U.S. Department of Agriculture places on birds 
raised for free-range meat is that there must be an access to the outdoors—often this ends up being a 
tiny area off of the shed that can fit only a few of the birds.  Id.  The birds also suffer serious health 
problems from the methods designed to quicken their growth.  Id.  Finally, they are still thrown into 
trucks to be taken to the same slaughterhouses as the non-free-range birds, where they are all “hung 
upside down, have their throats slit, and bleed to death, often while still fully conscious.”  Id.  There 
are similarly loose regulations for other “free-range” animals.  Id. 
 199.  Francione & Charlton, supra note 112, at 12. 
 200.  Favre, supra note 100. 
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interests.201  Favre asserts that it is also a logical step from our current law, 
allowing “animal interests to compete more fully with human interests, 
sometimes winning and sometimes losing.”202  A tort cause of action would 
allow animal interests to be asserted, accomplishing many of the goals of the 
rights approach, while controlling the ramifications through the limitations 
of the tort’s elements.  It would match the duty that already exists under 
criminal law statutes not to inflict unnecessary pain and suffering on 
animals, simply imposing a civil duty as well.203  It would also serve to 
increase the enforcement of animal laws by allowing individuals to bring 
suit rather than relying on a prosecutor or the government.204 
North Carolina has sought to achieve the goal of increased enforcement 
through a civil cause of action by enacting a statute that allows any person or 
organization to bring suit for injunction of violations of the state’s criminal 
anti-cruelty statute.205  This grant of standing to individuals to bring civil 
lawsuits to protect animal welfare is similar to the concept of a common law 
tort cause of action, and shows that the implementation of a civil cause of 
action is feasible.206  Unfortunately, the North Carolina legislature yielded to 
political pressure and included several exemptions from the statute, 
mirroring the types of exemptions for traditional animal uses that are found 
in state criminal anti-cruelty statutes and limiting its power to address many 
common types of animal cruelty, such as excessive and unnecessary cruelty 
in slaughterhouses or hunting practices.207 
A tort cause of action could fill this gap by preserving traditional 
“necessary” uses of animals (which could be at risk under a rights 
approach)208 while more effectively addressing conduct that surpasses 
 201.  See id. at 334. 
 202.  Id. at 336.  A tort cause of action would not be an unprecedented way to solve this issue.  
“New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of the common law is 
marked by many cases of first impression in which the court has struck out boldly to create a new 
cause of action where none had been recognized before.”  Id. at 334 n.2.  Examples of these types of 
new torts include the intentional infliction of mental suffering, the infliction of prenatal injuries, and 
the invasion of the right to privacy.  Id. 
 203.  Id. at 355. 
 204.  Id. at 356. 
 205.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19A-1 to 19A-4 (2003); see William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to 
Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunctions: The North Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL 
L. 39, 40 (2005). 
 206.  Both the North Carolina statute and a tort cause of action would allow for plaintiffs to bring 
claims for animal cruelty with a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof.  See Reppy, supra 
note 205, at 44. 
 207.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19A-1.1; Reppy, supra note 205, at 54–60.  The statute includes 
exemptions for the lawful taking of animals under the Wildlife Resources Commission; lawful 
research or training; production of livestock, poultry, or fish, lawful activities for the purpose of 
producing food; lawful veterinary practices; lawful destruction of an animal for the purpose of 
protecting the public; and lawful activities for sport.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19A-1.1. 
 208.  See supra Part V.A. 
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acceptable practices within those uses (which the welfare approach 
inadequately addresses),209 through a balancing of interests conducted by the 
trier of fact.  For instance, existing state and federal laws generally yield to 
current practices in laboratory research, accepting the industry standard for 
treatment of animals.210  A tort action could seek to enjoin a laboratory for 
excessive cruelty, such as failing to anesthetize animals for painful 
procedures where anesthetization would not interfere with the experiment.211  
However, the tort claim would fail in preventing experimentation altogether 
if the human interests in a necessary experiment were strong enough to 
override the animal’s claim.212  In this way, a court’s case-by-case 
determination would be much more adept at addressing animal cruelty than 
statutes with broad, generalized exceptions. 
Favre has named his new tort the “intentional interference with a 
fundamental interest of an animal.”213  Its elements are: 
1. That an interest is of fundamental importance to the plaintiff 
animal; 
2. That the fundamental interest has been interfered with or harmed 
by the actions or inactions of the defendant; 
3. That the weight and nature of the interests of the animal plaintiff 
substantially outweighs the weight and nature of the interests of the 
human defendant.214 
What constitutes a “fundamental interest” would be a question for the 
trier of fact, based on the scientific knowledge that could be produced.215  
 209.  See supra Part V.B. 
 210.  State anti-cruelty statutes typically exclude research practices, and the AWA defers to 
laboratories’ experimental designs.  See supra notes 109, 117 and accompanying text. 
 211.  Favre, supra note 100, at 346–47. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 334. 
 214.  Id. at 353. 
 215.  Id. at 357.  It would be the plaintiff’s burden to show facts proving a fundamental interest.  
Id.  For the second element, the interference must be intentional, “whether or not the specific 
consequence was intended.”  Id. at 359.  “As a matter of public policy, if an individual has 
possession of an animal, it should be presumed that he or she understands the animal’s and the 
species’s fundamental interests, and is willing and able to accommodate them.”  Id.  For the third 
element, the plaintiff must show that his interests substantially outweigh those of the defendant.  Id. 
at 360.  Viable alternatives for advancing the human interest may also be considered in the analysis.  
Id. at 360–61. 
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Favre used the “substantially outweighs” test to reflect that it would 
currently be too radical to give the interests of animals and humans equal 
weight.216  The remedies of the tort include money damages, injunctive 
relief, and title transfer.217 
Favre’s tort has been critiqued as impractical to implement.218  First, it 
could pose a threat to even necessary animal uses, such as life-saving 
medical research, because of frivolous lawsuits.219  Since monetary damages 
are offered as a remedy, and due to the costs of defending lawsuits, research 
facilities (which often operate through grants from the government) may run 
out of resources and shut down.220  The meat and dairy industries could also 
be targeted regardless of the companies’ actual treatment of animals, 
because some activist groups may abuse the cause of action by bringing 
lawsuits for the sole purpose of hurting the industries.221  The costs 
associated with the litigation would simply be shifted to consumers through 
raised prices for the products.222  Further, there may be many and varied 
lawsuits claiming something to be a “fundamental interest” of an animal.223  
For example, one could try to challenge the spaying and neutering of pets, 
claiming that reproduction is a fundamental interest.224  Even if these types 
of suits proved unsuccessful, they would place a burden on the court 
system.225   Second, Favre’s tort calls for a determination of whether an 
animal’s interests “substantially outweigh” human interests.226  This 
determination of the strength and value of the competing interests would be 
hard to quantify, especially when trying to assign a value to the strength of 
the animal’s interest in human terms.  The test of whether an interest 
“substantially outweighs” another interest also provides little guidance, as 
courts could interpret this differently.227  This would result in extensive 
 216.  Id. at 359. 
 217.  Id. at 366.  Favre includes monetary damages as a typically expected tort remedy.  Id.  In 
this case, if the plaintiff experienced pain and suffering, then compensation “sufficient to assure the 
conditions do not reoccur” would be appropriate.  Id.  The money would be put into a trust for the 
animal.  Id. 
 218.  Cupp, A Dubious Grail, supra note 170. 
 219.  Id. at 44–45.  Cupp notes that there are many animal activists that oppose all types of 
laboratory research, regardless of the significance of the research.  Id. at 44. 
 220.  Id. at 46. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. at 47.  It would be difficult to determine what constitutes a “fundamental” interest of an 
animal, resulting in speculation in many cases.  Id. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id. at 48. 
 226.  See supra text accompanying note 207. 
 227.  Cupp, A Dubious Grail, supra note 169, at 50.  Courts disfavor superlatives like 
“substantially outweighs” in tort law because they signal a lack of clarity in the test.  Id. 
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litigation over every claim.228  The test would not uniformly solve the 
problems that exist with the current welfare and rights approaches229 because 
courts would have room to assign a much higher value to human interests 
(including economic interests), rendering the test toothless; alternatively, 
other courts might decide that it is not ethical for economic interests to factor 
in to the equation, resulting in immense ramifications commensurate to those 
of the rights approach.230 
B.  A Modified Tort: The Wrongful Abuse of an Animal 
This Comment proposes a narrower tort that would address the concerns 
arising from Favre’s original conception of a tort cause of action for animals.  
The elements of the modified tort, which I term the “wrongful abuse of an 
animal,”231 should be as follows: (1) the defendant has caused the wrongful 
abuse of an animal; (2) the abuse was unnecessary; and (3) there is clear and 
convincing evidence that the abuse resulted in continuing physical or mental 
injury to the victim.  The only remedy available would be injunctive relief 
from the cruelty. 
What constitutes wrongful abuse would mirror anti-cruelty statutes, 
which include actions such as physical harm, torture, or neglect.232  In this 
respect, the tort would be similar to the North Carolina cause of action—a 
model that has already proven feasible233—in that it would provide greater 
enforcement for a standard that society already demands of individuals.234 
Next, a continuing injury could take the form of continuous and 
repeated physical or mental abuse, or abuse so great that it results in a lasting 
injury.235  There are three main reasons for requiring a continuing injury.  
 228.  Id.  Notably, the tort does not address whether the killing of animals would provide a 
successful cause of action, instead leaving this question to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
Id.; see Favre, supra note 100, at 364–65.  This is a difficult yet important ethical question, the 
answer to which is key to the animal rights debate and could have a drastic societal impact. 
 229.  See supra Part V. 
 230.  See supra Part V.A. 
 231.  The term “wrongful” is used to connote that defendants are liable for only unjustified 
abuses. 
 232.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 233.  See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
 234.  One difference is that the tort would not synthetically exclude particular animals.  See supra 
Part III.A. 
 235.  Examples of mental abuse could include being locked in a tiny cage, being unnaturally 
separated from family, or torture resulting in great mental injury.  A plaintiff would most likely try 
to prove continuing abuse through a showing of heightened intelligence and emotional capacity 
coupled with behavioral changes as a result of the abuse. 
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First, it narrows the scope of animal plaintiffs to match evolving scientific 
knowledge, because the animal must be capable of suffering continuing 
injury.236  In the case of unjustified continuing physical abuse, sentient 
animals that are capable of suffering may qualify.  However, in the case of 
mental abuse, the animal would require the mental capacity to be impacted 
by psychological abuse and to suffer for a longer period of time than the 
immediate harm.  At a minimum, this would require the ability to remember 
the abuse and the emotional sensitivity to be impacted by it (possibly 
requiring self-awareness).237  Second, because this tort seeks injunction, it 
would be an action in equity.  In weighing the equitable interests, animal 
protection would only be furthered by removing an animal if the cruelty was 
likely to continue in the future.238  Without the threat of continuing injury, 
there would be no reason to remove an animal from her owner.239  Third, the 
requirement of a continuing injury makes the tort more practical, namely by 
allowing society to continue using animals for food and other large 
industries. 
A plaintiff must show the existence of a continuing injury by clear and 
convincing evidence.  The wrongful abuse of an animal tort shares 
similarities with a proceeding for the termination of parental rights for 
abuse, which may be brought in addition to criminal charges for child abuse 
in order to remove a child from abusive parents to protect the child’s 
welfare.240  Thus, both actions provide the victims of abuse with 
supplemental protections outside of criminal statutes, and seek to place the 
animal or child in the best situation for his or her wellbeing.241  In 
proceedings for termination of parental rights, clear and convincing evidence 
is required in order for severance of parental rights to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.242  The clear and convincing 
evidence standard is similarly appropriate in the wrongful abuse of an 
animal context because some actions may result in enjoining a person’s 
ownership of an animal.  A legal analogy between protections for animals 
 236.  This would incorporate the scientific focus of the rights approach, while allowing for a more 
flexible standard—instead of drawing a line to confer rights on a specific category of beings, such as 
those that are sentient or self-aware, this standard is more closely tied to the actual injury and could 
be subject to change on a case-by-case basis.  It turns the focus toward requiring plaintiffs to prove 
an injury, albeit using scientific knowledge, rather than proving only a certain cognitive standard. 
 237.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  Thus, an animal that is confined to an undersized 
cage for a short period of time, and then does not have the capacity to remember or be affected by 
the abuse for long afterward, would not meet this standard. 
 238.  See Reppy, supra note 205, at 44 (“A judge asked to enjoin cruelty under the civil remedies 
law is unlikely to do so without credible evidence that cruelty will continue in the future.”). 
 239.  42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 91 (2012). 
 240.  See generally 43 C.J.S. Infants § 57 (2004). 
 241.  See id. 
 242.  Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
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and children is becoming increasingly appropriate, as the law progressively 
recognizes the animals as the victims rather than their human owners.243  
Animals have also been treated similarly to children in other areas of the 
law, such as in custody cases involving pets or in the ability to provide for 
an animal in a will or a trust.244 
The tort’s inclusion of the element of necessity is appropriate because 
authorities addressing animal protection consistently represent that only 
“unnecessary” actions toward animals should be prevented.245  The tort 
would thus adhere to current standards, acting similarly to the North 
Carolina statute and other state and federal laws in general, except through a 
more effective outlet.246  It would provide an appropriate balance between 
preserving traditional animal uses, which are not currently feasible to 
eliminate, and protecting against animal abuse that exceeds what is 
necessary to achieve those uses.247  For instance, this rule allows society to 
use animals for food, but would require industries to treat animals more 
humanely before they are killed.248  Important in the consideration of 
necessity is the feasibility of alternatives.249  If there is a feasible way to 
accomplish a necessary purpose while reducing animal suffering, it should 
be employed.250  Additionally, a consideration of alternatives would be 
consistent with the purpose of focusing on the animal’s wellbeing.251  
Depending on the alternatives, removing an animal from her current 
situation may do more harm than good.  For example, in the case of an 
 243.  State anti-cruelty statutes have developed to shift the focus from economic damages for 
animal owners to protecting the animals from harm, even when no human interests are at stake.  
Serafino, supra note 116, at 1120–25.  Federal statutes have similarly been enacted to improve 
conditions for animals, even though this may conflict with economically-ideal practices in the use of 
animals.  See supra notes 101–13 and accompanying text. 
 244.  See supra note 100. 
 245.  State and federal law, as well as the National Academy of Sciences, have indicated that 
necessity is an important determination when addressing animal use.  See supra notes 90–98, 133 
and accompanying text. 
 246.  See supra notes 101–18, 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See supra notes 206–10 and accompanying text. 
 248.  See, e.g., supra note 198. 
 249.  The National Academy of Sciences found that the necessity in using chimpanzees in medical 
research was dependent on the existence of alternatives.  See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying 
text.  Although the Academy’s report does not provide legal precedent, it is persuasive in that it was 
published by experts in current scientific knowledge about animals and a body that is involved in the 
field of animal use.  Thus, the Academy is close to the issue and may be in the best position to 
determine how to solve it. 
 250.  See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
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animal hoarder who is not taking proper care of her animals, the animals 
may be even worse off if they are sent to a shelter where they will be 
euthanized within a few days.252  Since this is an action in equity, it will be 
important for courts to consider the alternatives and determine the best 
solution for the parties involved.253  It is the plaintiff’s burden to show that 
the defendant’s actions are unnecessary and that there are feasible 
alternatives.254 
Limiting the remedy to injunctive relief and requiring the plaintiff to pay 
attorneys’ fees and costs if the judge finds that the suit is frivolous would 
serve to prevent the groundless lawsuits and excessive damage to industries 
of which critics warn.255  Alternatively, courts could assuage critics’ worries 
by issuing sanctions for frivolous claims.   
The orcas that brought suit against SeaWorld for their captivity256 serve 
to provide an example of the application of this tort.  First, the plaintiffs 
could likely show that SeaWorld’s actions constitute wrongful abuse, 
because the orcas have suffered physical harm due to inadequate living 
conditions.257  Second, this would likely constitute unnecessary abuse, 
because there are feasible alternatives.  SeaWorld could increase the size of 
its tanks and remove the orcas from unsuitable social pairings.  Third, there 
is clear and convincing evidence of continuing injury, because the orcas 
have exhibited behaviors proving extreme distress and lasting physical 
injury.258  Scientific knowledge about the cognitive abilities of whales 
further shows that the orcas would suffer continuous psychological 
injuries.259  Therefore, a court may make the equitable determination to 
 252.  The guardian bringing the case on behalf of the animal plaintiff would need to demonstrate 
that she has found a more suitable option, such as a foster home or no-kill shelter. 
 253.  See e.g., 43 C.J.S. Infants § 57 (2004) (“[T]he facts supporting the permanent deprivation 
must clearly show that the welfare of the children will be substantially subserved by such an 
action.”). 
 254.  This is consistent with state anti-cruelty statutes.  Reppy, supra note 205, at 55 (“The 
concept that the cruelty must be unjustifiable in order to warrant criminal punishment is found in 
most animal cruelty statutes, and courts usually hold that the prosecution has the burden of proof to 
show lack of justification.”). 
 255.  The requirement of paying the other side’s fees is not unprecedented.  For example, if a 
litigant rejects a settlement offer but the court’s final decision is significantly less favorable to the 
litigant than the settlement offer, that litigant must pay the other side’s litigation costs, including 
attorneys’ fees.  FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).  As another example, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees 
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006), provides that “the court in its discretion, may allow 
the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee” in certain actions. 
  Likewise, a prevailing plaintiff could be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to enable parties 
to bring suits.  However, this may be unnecessary: much of the litigation would likely be brought by 
animal activist groups eager to seek injunctions of abusive practices. 
 256.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 257.  See supra notes 140–45 and accompanying text. 
 258.  See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 259.  See supra notes 51–56, 68–69 and accompanying text. 
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enjoin SeaWorld from continuing to engage in its current treatment of the 
orcas, or to equitably remove the orcas to a better environment.260 
C.  A Brief Note on Standing 
There is some controversy over whether animals can achieve standing to 
assert a claim as a plaintiff.261  There have been courts that have held that an 
animal does not have standing to bring a claim.262  However, there have also 
been a number of cases that have included animals as named plaintiffs.263  
Nothing in the Constitution limits standing to only humans.264  This is 
demonstrated by the fact that entities such as corporations possess 
standing.265  Animals lack standing under federal statutes simply because 
Congress has not granted them standing under those provisions.266  
Therefore, this Comment contends that animals may bring claims as 
plaintiffs under a common law tort cause of action.267 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Current animal legislation is largely ineffective at protecting the 
interests of animals, while advancements in our knowledge of animal 
intelligence induce the conclusion that animals deserve better treatment.268  
 260.  A court may decide to grant injunction from the abusive practices in an initial suit, and 
remove the animal from the owner’s custody in the case of subsequent violations. 
 261.  See Wise, Legal Personhood, supra note 156, at 1, 2–5 (contending that in order to achieve 
standing, a plaintiff must achieve the legal status of “personhood”). 
 262.  See Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New Eng. Aquarium, 836 F. 
Supp. 45 (D. Mass. 1993). 
  This is not intended as a full discussion of this complex issue, but serves only to note the 
debate. 
 263.  Sunstein, Standing, supra note 106, at 1359; see Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural 
Res., 852 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988) (the palila bird “wings its way into federal court as a 
plaintiff in its own right” under the Endangered Species Act).  Additionally, under the Uniform Trust 
Act, a representative interested human can be appointed to sue on behalf of an animal.  Favre, supra 
note 100, at 363. 
 264.  See Sunstein, Standing, supra note 106, at 1360. 
 265.  See id. 
 266.  Id. at 1359. 
 267.  Like in cases involving children or incompetent persons, claims would be brought by a type 
of appointed guardian.  Favre, supra note 100, at 363–64 (“Our legal system has a number of 
mechanisms such as guardianships, next friends, legal representatives and social workers to deal 
with this issue.”). 
 268.  See supra Parts II, III. 
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In fact, some have argued that animals deserve rights of their own.269  This 
theory, however, could have drastic ramifications.270  In order to effectively 
balance the interests of animals with those of humans, a new solution is 
necessary, at least as a stepping stone to rights.  A tort cause of action to 
address unnecessary suffering, while it may seem duplicative of state and 
federal laws, is necessary to ensure that animal interests are protected and 
enforced.271 
Under this new tort cause of action, Loulis, the chimpanzee who was 
found awaiting his experimental fate in a death row of cells,272 would have a 
legal voice.  Since the continuously abusive conditions were unnecessary to 
any human interest,273 a court would be able to exercise its power under the 
tort to equitably change Loulis’s fate. 
Tania Rice* 
 
 269.  See supra Part IV. 
 270.  See supra Part V. 
 271.  See supra Part VI. 
 272.  See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 273.  Although the experimentation was designed to help cure a human disease, it was not a 
necessary part of the experiment to keep the animals in such poor conditions.  Moreover, scientists 
now know that using chimpanzees in laboratory research is ethically troubling and largely 
unnecessary, given the availability of other alternatives.  See supra Part II.D.  Therefore, the result of 
the use of this tort would be one that the scientific community would appear to support.  Id. 
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